The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of Discrete Normotypical and Pathological Modes
The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of States
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10203089Abstract
In this first-of-its-kind neurophenomenological study we investigated the dynamic configuration and the levels of variability of the “Self”-, “Me”-, and “I”- components that comprise a complex experiential Selfhood across 16 distinct modes covering a range of healthy-normal, altered, and pathological brain states. The phenomenology was addressed by examining the mental structures of subjective self-experience, and for the neurophysiological counterpart, we used electroencephalogram analysis to gather data on three subnets of the self-referential brain network that correspond to the three components of Selfhood. This methodological approach allowed us to uncover peculiarities and generalities in the dynamic of the Selfhood triad across a wide range of modes that could not be seen in a single study. We showed that any given Selfhood state is determined by varying proportions of “Self”, “Me”, and “I”-components depending on the phenomenological manifestation of a particular mode. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the “Self”-component has more leeway in expressing various pathological modes while having a very narrow window for variance in norm. The “I”-component, on the other hand, exhibits the opposite tendency, with a wide range of normal modes and only a narrow window for true pathological expression. Finally, the “Me”-component expresses a position intermediate between the “Self”- and “I”-components (though closer to the “I”-component). The findings are discussed with an emphasis on their theoretical, conceptual, philosophical, and clinical implications.
Keywords:
Triad Model of Selfhood, Self-Me-I, Self-Referential Brain Network (SRN), Default-Mode Network (DMN), Subjective Sense of Self, First-Person Perspective, Electroencephalogram (EEG), Alpha Rhythm, Operational Synchrony, Functional Connectivity, Depersonalization Disorder (DD), Depression, Meditation, Depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Schizophrenia, Vegetative State (VS), Minimally Conscious State (MCS), Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS)Downloads
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