Telepresence, the Brain, and Consciousness
Abstract
This article reexamines the long-standing assumption that consciousness arises solely from the forebrain, particularly the cerebral cortex. While traditional neuroscience has linked cortical activity with perception, reasoning, and the sense of self, alternative perspectives suggest that the brain’s most ancient structures — the cerebellum and brainstem — may play a foundational role in conscious experience. Through a combination of anatomical analysis, philosophical reflection, and thought experiments such as telepresence scenarios, this paper explores the possibility that consciousness could originate in the hindbrain, with the forebrain acting primarily as an interface for sensory and motor interaction. The discussion addresses common objections to this model, including findings from cerebellar agenesis and split-brain studies, and highlights new research implicating the cerebellum in higher cognitive functions. Broader implications for neuroscience and philosophy are considered, suggesting that a reevaluation of the hindbrain's role may reshape our understanding of consciousness and selfhood.
Keywords:
brain cerebellum consciousness telepresence virtual realityDownloads
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