2026-05-01T16:45:11Z https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/oai

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/1 2022-02-22T15:48:08Z jnp:rev

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/2 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:opper

The Cult of the Expert is Killing Science Pockett, Susan science cult expert scientist human nature health risk cell phone electromagnetic science criticism health risk It is argued that the Cult of the Expert is a manifestation of a new culture of active corruption, in which the findings of science are manipulated and misrepresented, to both politicians and the public, in the service of commercial and political interests.  This situation causes perfectly justifiable public mistrust of "experts" and threatens to kill off the whole institution of science as a trustworthy way of understanding the world. AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/2 10.5281/zenodo.6637745 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/2/21 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/2/189 Copyright (c) 2022 Susan Pockett https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/3 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:rev

What is Neurophilosophy and How Did Neurophilosophy Get Started? Smith Churchland, Patricia neurophilosophy history mind brain Churchland David Chalmers Thomas Nagel Quine As neuroscience has intensely developed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we increasingly see neurobiological results that bear upon age-old philosophical questions about the mind and its relation to the brain. Although neuroscience has not yet completely answered questions about learning and memory, or about attention, social impulses and sleep, for all these topics there are now relevant results. These results suggest that more can and will be understood in the coming years, especially as new techniques and methods are discovered and applied. Arguments from philosophers regarding why consciousness in particular cannot ever be explained neurobiologically are also critically examined. On this contentious topic too, clinical neurologists in particular have sought ways of determining the conscious status of their patients in order better to treat them. Even on this topic there is early but promising neurobiological progress. AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/3 10.5281/zenodo.6637568 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/3/17 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/3/191 Copyright (c) 2022 Patricia Smith Churchland https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/5 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:artic

Magnetoencephalography, Diffusion Tensor Imaging and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in Managing Cognitive Behavioral Changes after Intracranial Vascular Surgery Idris, Zamzuri Ismail, Muhammad Ihfaz Fitzrolo, Diana Noma Mohamed Mustafar, Mohammed Faiz Umar, Hafidah Abdullah, Jafri Malin cognition, neuro-behavior aneurysm magnetoencephalography diffusion tensor imaging DTI MEG Some frontal and temporal lobe areas are known to be part of the limbic system. The prefrontal, orbitofrontal and basal forebrain nuclei are examples of frontal lobe anatomical structures that have direct connections with the hippocampus, amygdala and basal ganglia component of the limbic system. The cognitive functions that are associated with these areas are memory, behavior and attention. Surgical clipping of a ruptured intracranial anterior circulation aneurysm would require some manipulation or retraction force applied to these regions and with concurrent presence of cisternal hemorrhages, brain edema and swelling, neurocognitive impairment is likely. By using state of the art technique in magnetoencephalography (MEG), diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and standard neuropsychological assessment tools, gross abnormalities in brainwave morphology, contour of white matter fibers and neuropsychological scores were detected. Appealingly, these abnormalities were also used to rehabilitate the cognitively impaired individuals by using neuro-navigation guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and utilizing stimulatory (fast) and inhibitory (slow) mode of the repetitive stimulation.  AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/5 10.5281/zenodo.6637764 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/5/23 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/5/192 Copyright (c) 2022 Zamzuri Idris, Muhammad Ihfaz Ismail, Diana Noma Fitzrolo, Mohammed Faiz Mohamed Mustafar, Hafidah Umar, Jafri Malin Abdullah https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/6 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:artic

Examining Some Serious Challenges and Possibility of AI Emulating Human Emotions, Consciousness, Understanding and ‘Self’ Tariq, Sadia Iftikhar, Asif Chaudhary, Puruesh Khurshid, Khurram mind brain Artificial Intelligence emotions Hermeneutics consciousness AI and Philosophy Artificial Intelligence Philosophy of Science This research falls in the ambit of ‘AI and Philosophy’. It explores why emulating the complex processes of subjective experience, emotions, consciousness, self-awareness, and the human personality, will be a huge challenge for AI research. It touches upon some finer aspects, like the huge variety of human emotions and feelings, processes of future and fringe consciousness, and the evolution of self-awareness and complex human self/personality, whose practical realization in an AI system would be very difficult, if not impossible. In the backdrop of these serious challenges it also discusses an interesting possibility of emulation in the field of Hermeneutics, focusing on hermeneutics of ṣan‘at-e ihām (construction of ambiguity) in Urdu, Persian, Arabic, Hindi, and Punjabi poetry. The basic purpose of this work is to underscore the critical importance of this area for AI research, and to shed light on those aspects of consciousness, emotions, awareness, understanding and self whose comprehension and inclusion is necessary in designing and constructing AI systems that can parallel human mental functioning. AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/6 10.5281/zenodo.6637757 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/6/22 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/6/193 Copyright (c) 2022 Sadia Tariq, Asif Iftikhar, Puruesh Chaudhary, Khurram Khurshid https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/8 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:opper

Too Rational: How Predictive Coding’s Success Risks Harming the Mentally Disordered and Ill Elkin, Lee Wiśniowska, Karolina predictive coding Bayesian brain ASD schizophrenia ethics The so-called predictive coding or predictive processing theory of mind has attracted significant attention in the brain and behavioral sciences over the past couple of decades. We aim to discuss an important ethical implication of the theory’s success. As predictive coding has become influential in the study of mental disorder and illness, particularly on autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia, we point out a significant risk of further harming an already stigmatized population. Specifically, because predictive coding is undergirded by Bayesian inference, and Bayesian inference is often thought to imply ‘rationality’, the cognitive framework engenders a risk of strengthening existing negative attitudes towards individuals having mental disorders and illnesses by associating such individuals with also having ‘irrational brains.’ AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/8 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/8/19 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/8/194 Copyright (c) 2022 Lee Elkin, Karolina Wiśniowska https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/10 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:opper

Midwifing a Science of Consciousness: the Role of Kuhnian Paradigms Pockett , Susan Kuhn NCC paradigm in consciousness neural correlates of consciousness neuron doctrine science It is argued that in terms of Thomas Kuhn's analysis of how different fields of science develop and progress, consciousness research is still in the pre-paradigm or pre-science phase that precedes the advent of any universally accepted paradigm.  A means by which this long-standing situation may be escaped is here suggested. This is to treat each of the three distinct theoretical positions that presently drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness as mini-paradigms and then apply the same logic that Kuhn sees as underpinning paradigm shifts in mature sciences to decide which of these three mini-paradigms becomes the first universally accepted paradigm of a mature science of consciousness. At present, the three mini-paradigms that drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness are: (1) the cognitive-science process theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is a process, not a thing"), (2) the neurophysiologists' preferred psychoneural identity theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is brain activity") and (3) the EMF field theory mini-paradigm  ("consciousness is a 4-D electromagnetic pattern generated by brain activity"). In established science, paradigms shift when enough 'anomalies' – falsified predictions or largely unrecognised but once-recognised-unacceptable consequences – build up to make the existing paradigm uncomfortable for those who operate within it.  At this point, a sudden paradigm shift occurs, ushering in another long period of 'normal science' during which the new paradigm drives experimentation. With regard to the three existing mini-paradigms on the nature of consciousness, it is argued that (1) recognition that processes are abstract entities –and that this renders the "consciousness is a process, not a thing" mini-paradigm dualist – makes this mini-paradigm unacceptable to practitioners who regard dualism as unscientific and who prefer to see themselves as staunchly scientific, and therefore as monists. (By definition, monists equate consciousness with physical entities, while dualists equate it with abstract entities). (2) The strong prediction of the "consciousness is brain activity" mini-paradigm – that conscious experiences should invariably correlate with the firing of either particular single neurons or groups of single neurons in the brain – has now been falsified often enough to make this mini-paradigm unacceptable to its practitioners. And this leaves intact only the "consciousness is a 3-D electromagnetic field" mini-paradigm – the idea that conscious experiences are particular 3-dimensional (or, given that they change in time, strictly speaking 4-dimensional) patterns in the electromagnetic field generated by brain activity. And as a result, it is suggested that this third mini-paradigm might usefully become the first universally accepted full paradigm, which would finally allow announcement of the birth of a Kuhnian science of consciousness. AnKa :: publisher 2022-04-18 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/10 10.5281/zenodo.6637736 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/10/20 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/10/195 Copyright (c) 2022 Susan Pockett https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/11 2026-01-31T13:22:20Z jnp:rev

Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy – What Is It and How It Can Contribute To Philosophy Northoff, Georg neurophilosophy neurophenomenology Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness mind-body problem Merleau-Ponty What is neurophilosophy? Different variants of connecting neuroscience and philosophy emerged in recent years. Besides reductive, parallelistic, and neurophenomenological variants, we here focus on Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy (NRNP) as introduced by the author of this paper. NRNP can methodologically be characterized by the inclusion of multiple domains (ontological, epistemological, empirical, etc.) and various methodological strategies (like logical-conceptual and observational-experimental) – this amounts to domain pluralism and method pluralism. That is combined with an iterative methodological movement between the different domains and, specifically conceptual and empirical domains resulting in concept-fact iterativity. Such non-reductive neurophilosophical approach can make major contributions to both neuroscience and philosophy. Concerning the latter, we demonstrate how a non-reductive neurophilosophical approach allows taking into view a deeper neuro-ecological and spatiotemporal layer of Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology and its “being in the world”. This may also require a more fundamental approach to consciousness in both its phenomenological features and neural basis – this has recently been proposed in the “Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness” (TTC). In sum, due to its particular methodological strategy, NRNP allows providing a broader more comprehensive framework to philosophical problems like subjectivity, consciousness, and mind-body problem (and various others). Moreover, NRNP may provide a novel deeper framing and reading of historical authors (like Kant, Heidegger, Whitehead, etc.) which may allow to connect them to current and systematic philosophical and even neuroscientific issues. AnKa :: publisher 2022-05-12 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/11 10.5281/zenodo.6637657 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/11/18 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/11/196 Copyright (c) 2022 Georg Northoff https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/16 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:mnpo

My way to Non-reductive Neurophilosophy: Georg Northoff: How did I come to non-reductive neurophilosophy? Northoff, Georg neuroscience non-reductive neurophilosophy Northoff How did I come to non-reductive neurophilosophy? Let me sketch my biography a little. When I was young, I always wanted to study philosophy, the basic questions of the world, humans and the mind fascinated me – going down to the bottom of things. However, I did not want to study philosophy in isolation from the science. My fascination was and still is on the mind and specifically subjectivity as core feature of the mind. Subjectivity and mind are obviously key topics in philosophy. However, having grown up from the mid/end of the 20th century allowed me to also study the mind empirically and thus to complement philosophy by science. At my time there were no neuroscience programs yet. Hence, the only way to study the brain and its connection to the mind was to go into medicine which I did parallel to my philosophy studies. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/16 10.5281/zenodo.7254063 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/16/43 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/16/197 Copyright (c) 2022 Georg Northoff https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/21 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:lett

Demystifying Consciousness and Non-cognitive Theories of Consciousness Cheng, Tony In “A conceptual framework for consciousness,” Michael Graziano provides a substantive conceptual framework for explaining consciousness. In this commentary I will focus on the way Graziano sets up the issue, which fails to capture the opposition accurately. The opponent of Graziano’s approach is no mysticism, but non-cognitive theories exemplified by, e.g., Ned Block’s Overflow thesis. Without identifying the opponent accurately, its significance cannot be fully appreciated. In this commentary I attempt to capture the real disagreement to facilitate further communications. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/21 10.5281/zenodo.7254072 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/21/44 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/21/198 Copyright (c) 2022 Tony Cheng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/23 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:artic

Having the Foggiest Idea: A Gradual Account on Mental Images Šekrst, Kristina aphantasia mental images hyperphantasia impressions signified First described by Galton in 1880 and then remaining unnoticed for a century, recent investigations in neuroscience have shown that a condition called aphantasia appears in certain individuals, which causes them to be unable to experience visual mental imagery. Comparing aphantasia to hyperphantasia – i.e., photo-like memory – and considering the neurological basis of perceptual phenomena, we are revisiting Hume's division of perceptions into impressions and ideas. By showing different vivacities of mental phenomena and comparing them to neurological research, we are stating that not only impressions and ideas differ "in the degrees of force and liveliness", but ideas and impressions amongst themselves as well. Such a gradual range of perceptions and mental images bears significant consequences for not only representational theory and historical interpretations but linguistics and semiotics as well. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/23 10.5281/zenodo.7254024 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/23/40 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/23/199 Copyright (c) 2022 Kristina Šekrst https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/24 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:hat

Where and What: Two Experiments for Dualism Bucci, Andrea In 2007, two experiments that have now become very famous have appeared in the neuroscientific literature. With over of one thousand of citation, that moved neuroscientist to speculate about the self- representation and other conscious phenomena and to create new experiments, Henrik Ehrsson and Bigna Lengenhagger produce in two studies out of the body experiences in healthy subjects. The literature reports this kind of experience as consequence of neurological disease or drug use. In this article, I will prove that the where, and the what, of the out of the body experience and the normal experience are something different from the bodily one and I will argue in favor of some kind of dualism and, in particular, a dualism called property dualism. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/24 10.5281/zenodo.7253845 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/24/34 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/24/200 Copyright (c) 2022 Andrea Bucci https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/25 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:hat

The Expanding Universe Delusion Caused by the Doppler Effect in the Human Brain Doğan, Furkan Speed of light Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation Doppler Effect Big Bang Isaac Newton (1643-1727) introduced physics mechanics that yielded successful results for an Earth-sized environment. In the following years, it is observed that these successful mechanics led to wrong results in wider regions. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) accepted the speed of light as a constant to correct these errors and introduced the idea of "special relativity" in this context. This idea does not adequately explain the "visible universe" formed as a web of galaxies and its microwave history. The fact that the cosmic microwave background radiation is in the form of a geoid rather than a sphere proves that the speed of light varies slightly between universal dimensions. In connection with this, the Doppler effect creates a critical delusion in the human brain. According to this effect, that is considered one of the most vital proofs of the Big Bang theory the universe is expanding. The main problem with this proof is that the center point of the big bang is always at the location of the observer. The fact is that explosion that occurs in a single region cannot have countless different explosion centers. That leads to the conclusion that the expanding universe model is a brain delusion. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/25 10.5281/zenodo.7253905 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/25/37 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/25/201 Copyright (c) 2022 Furkan Doğan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/26 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:artic

Front Waves of Chemical Reactions and Travelling Waves of Neural Activity Zhang, Yidi Guo, Shan Sun, Mingzhu Mariniello, Lucio Tozzi, Arturo Zhao, Xin central nervous system; chaos; chemical reaction; spontaneous activity; BOLD activity; nonlinear dynamics. Travelling waves crossing the nervous networks at mesoscopic/macroscopic scales have been correlated with different brain functions, from long-term memory to visual stimuli. Here we investigate a feasible relationship between wave generation/propagation in recurrent nervous networks and a physical/chemical model, namely the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction (BZ). Since BZ’s nonlinear, chaotic chemical process generates concentric/intersecting waves that closely resemble the diffusive nonlinear/chaotic oscillatory patterns crossing the nervous tissue, we aimed to investigate whether wave propagation of brain oscillations could be described in terms of BZ features. We compared experimentally detected oscillations during the spontaneous activity of the brain with BZ-like concentric waves simulated by a recently introduced artificial network.  The observed overlap and agreement between simulated and measured oscillatory patterns suggests that changes in cortical areas’ neural activity might be described in terms of a recognizable diffusion pattern.  We describe biological plausibility, benefits and limits of our approach and discuss the relationship among BZ-like networks, Pandemonium-like architectures and the spontaneous activity of the brain. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/26 10.5281/zenodo.7254050 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/26/42 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/26/202 Copyright (c) 2022 Arturo Tozzi, Yidi Zhang, Shan Guo, Mingzhu Sun, Lucio Mariniello, Xin Zhao https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/28 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:opper

Doubts about the World Out There: A Monadological Redux Globus, Gordon monadology consciousness Leibniz quantum brain theory thermofield brain dynamics world thrownness ontological duality The focus here is on the neglected, simply accepted, quotidian world, rather than the much-discussed consciousness. Contra common sense and science both, any actual independent external world out there is here denied. World is conceived instead as a continual creation on the part of each quantum thermofield brain in parallel, which is “triply-tuned”: by sensory input, by memory and by self-tuning (intentionality). Such a brain does not primarily process information—does not compute—but through its multiple tunability achieves an internal match in which a world is disclosed, even though there is no world out there, only objects under quantum description at microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic scales. This unconventional formulation revives a version of monadology via quantum brain theory. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/28 10.5281/zenodo.6637338 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/28/32 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/28/203 Copyright (c) 2022 Gordon Globus https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/30 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:mnpo

My Journey to Neurophilosophy: Paul Thagard Thagard, Paul philosophy neuroscience neurophilosoophy philosophy of science cognitive science neural networks theoretical neuroscience consciousness Paul Thagard describes how his current work in neurophilosophy grew out of a long series of engagements with philosophy, philosophy of science, cognitive science, neural networks, and theoretical neuroscience. Each of these engagements had cumulative advantages over its predecessors.  Neurophilosophy is prospering by applying insights about the workings of the brain to central problems in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/30 10.5281/zenodo.7740227 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/30/58 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/30/212 Copyright (c) 2022 Paul Thagard https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/31 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:hat

How to Create a Life or Mind: As the Explanation of Our Consciousness, Intelligence and Language Zhang, Xinyan Life Mind Brain Consciousness Intelligence Language Memory Qualia Meaning Mind-body relation Natural selection Against the ideas of dualism, logocentrism, anthropocentrism, animism, panpsychism, biocentrism, neurocentrism, foundationalism, computationalism, especially substantialism, reductionism and even physicalism*, the author argues that life may be the only non-reductive concept, even the only ontological concept, with which we may explain our consciousness, intelligence and language. Life, as defined in this article, explains but not only human brains, and even not only biological organisms. Still, the mind, also as defined in this article, is the only one it explains. No mind may exist if not be a life or lives, and no life may exist if not be a mind or a part of it. If it is the mind that needs to be explained, it must finally and fundamentally be explained as a life or lives. If the question is about the origin of the mind, a life or lives must be the ultimate answer. In other words, life is the only attribute of mind, and mind also the only attribute of life, and therefore, consciousness, intelligence and language must be the properties of all the living systems, including non-biological living systems. A model of mind is hypothesized based on the analysis of two kinds of lives and their relationship with matter and energy. It may be deduced from this model: 1. All the memories of a living brain are its intelligence. 2. Both consciousness and nonconscious are only meaningless languages used in the communication among lives in an awakened brain. 3. Life is the only meaning of all those memories and languages. Ontologically, life may even be the only meaning of all matter and energy. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/31 10.5281/zenodo.7253901 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/31/36 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/31/204 Copyright (c) 2022 Xinyan Zhang https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/32 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:hat

The Myth of Consciousness: The Reality of Brain-Sign Clapson, Philip brain function; brain-sign; collective action; consciousness; interneural communication; science per se The physical sciences, as generally understood, are disciplines concerned with the characteristics and behavior of physical objects and states. What is evident about the current condition of consciousness is that: 1) It has no identified physical states; 2) There is no generally accepted vocabulary of its functioning, or its participant entities; and 3) No ‘normal science’ operative structure upon which a community of scientists agree (ref. T. Kuhn). The reasons are that consciousness is a prescientific concept persisting because there is no adequate physicalist theory to replace it, and because biology operates in a way ‘invisible’ to assumed mental processes and vocabulary. What is required is a plausible theory built on a biophysical base. A theory is being developed: it is termed the theory of brain-sign. Brain-sign replaces consciousness as an evolved neural operation in which brains communicate with each other in the collective action of organisms, so addressing the limitations of being an isolated individual. It depends upon neural signification (as brain-sign), in this case of the organisms’ immediate causal orientation towards the world. Thus, multiple organisms are linked as one biophysical operation. Signs are biologically ubiquitous and inherently physical. Organisms are not subjective agents with transcendent (quasi-divine) powers acting in a perceivable world, but evolved organic objects with the ability to cooperate as one overarching biological process. It is anticipated this theoretical operation and vocabulary will explain brain function, which mind fails to do. It accounts for science from both its neural origins and its communal nature. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/32 10.5281/zenodo.7253888 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/32/35 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/32/207 Copyright (c) 2022 Philip Clapson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/33 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:opper

What are Conscious Sensations? Pockett , Susan monism dualism process theories vehicle theories neural identity theory NCCs CEMF theory Existing theories about the nature of conscious sensations are discussed.  The oldest classification system contrasts dualist theories (which say consciousness is an abstract entity) with monist theories (which say consciousness is a concrete entity).  A more recent system contrasts process theories ("consciousness is a process, not a thing") with vehicle theories (consciousness is a property of one or more of the things associated with brain processes). The present paper first points out that processes are abstracta, which makes process theories dualist. It then argues that (a) dualist theories are untestable and therefore unscientific and (b) process theories which invoke information are at odds with the normal definition of information.  Then two separate kinds of vehicle theory are discussed: first the neural identity theory and then a theory that pulls together the enormous volume of data generated by Crick's suggestion to forget about theories and simply measure the neural correlates of consciousness into a proposal equating sensory consciousness with certain patterns in the electromagnetic fields generated by brain function.  The paper concludes with an injunction to stop researching this topic altogether, on the grounds that the results are likely to be used in unacceptably dystopian developments. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/33 10.5281/zenodo.7740150 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/33/69 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/33/213 Copyright (c) 2022 Susan Pockett https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/34 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:artic

Depersonalization Puzzle: A New View from the Neurophenomenological Selfhood Perspective Fingelkurts, Andrew Fingelkurts, Alexander Self-referential brain network (SRN) Default-mode network (DMN) Subjective sense of self First-person perspective Electroencephalogram (EEG) Alpha rhythm Operational synchrony Functional connectivity Depersonalisation Disorder (DD) dissociative episodes triad model of Selfhood, Self-Me-I While there is still a limited understanding of the Selfhood phenomenon, an emerging consensus is that the experiential Selfhood refers to a sense of the undergoing experience in its implicit first-person mode of givenness that is immediately and tacitly given as “mine”. It is also evident that there are phenomenological disruptions within self-consciousness ranging from normal everyday short-lived dissociative episodes to pathological, intense and prolonged forms of dissociative experience classified as depersonalization disorder (DD). In the present study we explored the neurophenomenology of Selfhood (using the recently introduced neurophysiological three-dimensional construct model of experiential Selfhood, Fingelkurts et al., 2020) in a newly diagnosed and untreated 29-year-old female who suffers from DD. According to the triad model of Selfhood, three major components of Selfhood (phenomenal first-person agency – “Self”, embodiment – “Me”, and reflection/narration – “I”) are related to three operational modules (OMs) of the self-referential brain network (reliably estimated by electroencephalogram operational synchrony analysis). We have found that subject with DD exhibited a strong enhancement of functional integrity of the brain Self-module, a moderate decrease in the functional integrity of Me-module, and a pronounced decrease in the functional integrity of I-module, – all of which were associated with severity of specific DD symptoms. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/34 10.5281/zenodo.7253994 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/34/39 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/34/208 Copyright (c) 2022 Andrew Fingelkurts, Alexander Fingelkurts https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/35 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:artic

The Effect of Sufi Breath and Meditation on Quantitative EEG: Is There a Difference? Can Aren, Ebru Tarlacı, Sultan Brain QEEG Spiritual Energy Meditation Breath In this paper, we present a case study with quantitative EEG (QEEG) data to examine the neurophysiological effects of a specific breathing and meditation practice rooted in the Sufi esoteric practices of the Islamic tradition. The practice includes several coordinated cognitive activities. To evaluate the effects of the chosen breath and meditation practice, we compared the functional states of the brain in five frequency (from delta to gamma) bands before and after the completion of a 10-week practice. Statistically significant differences were found particularly in coherence and absolute power scores which are recorded during a no-task state. The increased synchronization and coherence within and between brain regions suggest that changes may be associated with negative entropy quality of spiritual energies. Conversely, the positive entropy has proven to be basis of many mental and physical disorders such as depression. This brain exercise helps permanently reshape the functional connectivity in the brain in a more neurologically conducive way. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/35 10.5281/zenodo.7254040 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/35/41 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/35/209 Copyright (c) 2022 Ebru Can, Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/36 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:artic

Investigation of the Relationship between Anxiety Disorder and Time Perception with DRD2 rs1800497 Polymorphism Şan, Hüseyin Oğuzhan Tarlacı, Sultan Ulucan, Korkut Polat, Tolga Yilmaz, Ozlem Ozge Aslan, Beste Tacal Time Perception Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) Internal Clock Anxiety Polymorphism We have many biological systems that regulate the perception of time, which is one of our most essential abilities that allows subjectively predicting, perceiving and understanding the duration of experiences, feelings and achievements. There are findings obtained from many studies aiming to illuminate the place and importance of time, which was the most critical reference point for human understanding of life in the past, for us mammals. According to these findings, it is observed that there is a similar mechanism that provides the perception of time in almost every living organism. Time perception is vital for the healthy functioning of cognitive activities, physiological needs and behavioral relations, and the bio-psycho-social order's systematicity. Among the studies conducted, the findings obtained in the studies related to the effect of psychiatric disorders on the perception of time are somewhat blurry compared to the others. The research for this study was based on six basic Polymorphisms known to affect time perception and internal clock mechanisms. These are as follows: SLC6A4 / 5-HTTLPR, 5HT2A / T102C, DRD2 / TAQ1A, SLC6A3 / 3UTR VNTR, COMT / VAL158MET, GABRB2 A/C, CLOCK. In our study, the relationship between the rs1800497 polymorphism, which is one of these seven polymorphisms that are effective in the functioning of the internal clock in the human brain, and the inventory used in the measurement of anxiety, was examined in 14 participants. Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) was used to measure anxiety, and PCR was used to detect genetic variants. When the findings were evaluated, no significant relationship was found between anxiety and DRD2 rs1800497 polymorphism. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/36 10.5281/zenodo.7253914 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/36/38 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/36/211 Copyright (c) 2022 Hüseyin Oğuzhan ŞAN, Sultan Tarlacı, Korkut Ulucan, Tolga Polat, Ozlem Ozge Yilmaz, Beste Tacal Aslan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/37 2026-01-31T13:34:53Z jnp:opper

Biological Requirements Behind Brain Function and Mind Formation Zand, Hamid Mind; Internalism; Externalism; Diet; Nutrients; Microbiome The major conflict in the old philosophy of mind was the material or supernatural origin of mind and consciousness. Based on new neuroscientific findings, philosophers have become more cautious in considering the immaterial origin of the mind. At present, the main debate in the philosophy of mind is the dependence or independence of mental phenomena on information and signals received from the outside world. If we consider the brain as a living organ and the mind as a product of brain activity, the need of this organ for matter and energy obtained from nature has been neglected as signals. Gut hormones, food-derived nutrients, and gut microbiome effects influence brain functions. Therefore, it is impossible to consider a brain separated from the surrounding world as long as it is alive and needs nutrient flow. AnKa :: publisher 2022-10-26 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/37 10.5281/zenodo.7253813 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2022) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/37/33 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/37/210 Copyright (c) 2022 Hamid Zand https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/38 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:artic

Investigation of the Relationship between Anxiety Disorder and Time Perception with Perceptional Paradigm Şan, Hüseyin Oğuzhan Tarlacı, Sultan Ulucan, Korkut Polat, Tolga Yilmaz, Ozlem Ozge Aslan, Beste Tacal Time Perception Internal Clock Retrospective Time Prospective Time Anxiety Anxiety is a pathological condition, as well as a condition that is continued in nature according to the event and situation to keep the vitality alive. For this reason, it is challenging to examine the relationship between the perception of time and the anxiety disease experienced within the limits of normality. Anxiety is one of the most studied topics today. It is also thought that the physical symptoms of anxiety affect cognitive processes. Anxiety, which is observed either alone or in combination with many disorders, shows a possible relationship between the perception of time and some findings related to the subject. These findings show us that people with anxiety disorder have a faster perception of time and a shorter perception estimation. Noticeably more significant differences were found in studies withadolescents. This study used the Beck Anxiety Scale, Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, Retrospective and Prospective Time Perception Paradigm, and a Demographic Information Form to collect data. As the variables thought to affect the results of the study were detected in 44 of the 212 randomly selected participants, these participants were excluded from the evaluation, and this study was continued with the data of 168 participants. When the findings are evaluated in general, there is a significant difference between the anxiety scale scores of the sample group and the gender variable. According to this finding, it can be said that the level of anxiety varies between men and women. By looking at the 10, 20, 30, and 40-second video reactions of the participants showing anxiety symptoms; It has been determined that anxiety impairs the time perception of individuals. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/38 10.5281/zenodo.7740187 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/38/68 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/38/214 Copyright (c) 2022 Hüseyin Oğuzhan ŞAN, Sultan Tarlacı, Korkut Ulucan, Tolga Polat, Ozlem Ozge Yilmaz, Beste Tacal Aslan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/42 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:opper

In Search of the Ultimate Model Felton, Melvin philosophy of science metaphysics neuroscience physics artificial intelligence complexity self-similarity In recent years, researchers from a variety of scientific disciplines have begun to notice surprising similarity between the network and topological features of the human brain, or brain-like systems in general, and the picture of the universe emerging out of theoretical physics.  In this paper, I discuss some of these recent developments and suggest ways to further investigate structural and dynamical similarities between the human brain and universe.  I discuss the impact that a close correspondence between these two systems would have on research in the fields of neuroscience and theoretical physics, and I discuss what type of fundamental underlying processes could have given rise to such a relationship between the brain and universe.  Given the high demand in fields like theoretical physics for a system capable of modeling the universe, I suggest a systematic comparison of the ideas emerging out of physics concerning the fundamental nature of the universe, and the ideas emerging out of neuroscience concerning the fundamental nature of the brain and mind. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/42 10.5281/zenodo.7740138 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/42/67 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/42/215 Copyright (c) 2022 Melvin Felton https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/45 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:hat

Some Social Aspects of the Soul of Multiverse Hypothesis: Human Societies and the Soul of Multiverse Ludvig, Nandor soul prefrontal cortex multiverse noosphere conscience social justice government of Earth As a continuation of this author’s previous cosmological neuroscience papers on the hypothesized Soul of Multiverse and its possible laws, the present work examined the social aspects of four of these laws. The following key aspects were recognized: (1) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Coexistence in Diversity can let our mind respect not only the endless diversity of human beings but also the cohesive force of space-time in which all are connected.  This may help realizing the superiority of cooperation for shared goals over competition for gaining by harming others. (2) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Truth in Complexity can ready our mind to confront the problems of societies with the understanding that these problems are much more complex than generally thought. This may help initiating the needed intellectual renaissance of the 21st century. (3) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Divine - Evil Asymmetry can make our mind appreciate the slight yet sufficient supremacy of divine over evil.  This may help restoring faith in the eventual creation of a just society, where social justice is defined as an administrative mechanism providing the right conditions for every human being to accomplish his or her Conscience-led Mission throughout life, while allowing each of these accomplishments to be reciprocated with the gratitude it induced in the involved social systems, small or large, to let equal opportunities in life coexist with due diversity in welcomed, not abused, social recognitions. And (4) knowing about the cosmic Law of Lives to Transcend can empower our mind to build on these advances. This may help moving evolution towards the human species worthy of its origin and destination. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/45 10.5281/zenodo.7740165 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/45/66 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/45/216 Copyright (c) 2022 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/47 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:artic

A Critique of Libet and Wegner’s Argument Against Free Will Fosu-Blankson, Ferdinard Inusah, Husein free will readiness potential conscious will decision-making The research of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner are groundbreaking works in neuropsychology that make arguments against human freedom. However, Libet’s and Wegner’s arguments are marred with some philosophical inconsistencies including; misconceptions, logical errors, and causal fallacies which seems to emanate from the problem of subjecting the concept of free will to an empirical enquiry only. In this essay, it is argued that empirical enquiry alone limits the study of the role of consciousness and its involvement in decision-making. It is suggested that scientific assessment alone may not be exhaustive in the evaluation of the idea of free will considering the role of consciousness and the absence of causal evidence between the interactions of the mind and the brain. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/47 10.5281/zenodo.7740201 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/47/65 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/47/217 Copyright (c) 2023 Ferdinard Fosu-Blankson, Husein Inusah https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/48 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:pfn

Solving Mind-Body Issues Requires Combining Philosophical Reflection and Empirical Research Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Marja-Liisa Panpsychism Neurophenomenology Interdisciplinary Philosophy Empirical research This paper argues that to progress with philosophical issues concerning brain-mind relations one needs to combine philosophical reflection and empirical research with theoretical model building. Philosophy and abstract theorizing alone do not carry us far, as will be illustrated by analyzing the views about panpsychism by the quantum physicist David Bohm, who builds his reasoning on quantum mechanical analogies. His reflection around the notion of active information, adopted in his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics to replace the Newtonian notion of force, turns out to be a fallacy of equivocation. His other line of reasoning to specify matter-mind unity in terms of soma-significance and signa-somatic processes yields problems of its own. To illustrate empirical investigations on brain-mind relations, I shall present the tripartite model of the experiential selfhood and the related Self-Me-I index as proposed by the neuroscientists Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, along with their background theory called operational architectonics (OA) of brain-mind functioning. The model states that the three components of selfhood, Self, Me, and I, correlate to three distinct operationally synchronized cortical areas, the frontal cortex, the right posterior cortex, and the left posterior cortex. The philosophical and practical benefits of their framework will be exemplified by presenting the results of a series of studies with the philosopher Tarja Kallio-Tamminen about the effects of meditation reflected in the Self-Me-I index. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/48 10.5281/zenodo.7740219 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/48/64 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/48/218 Copyright (c) 2023 Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/52 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:hat

How Testosterone and Serotonin Drive the Shift in Global Power Dynamics, and Geopolitics of Social Conflict in the Clash of Civilizations Barzilai, Roy Sex hormones chronosociobiology geopolitics social conflict evolutionary psychology The recent atrocious war starting in 2022 between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the underlying fundamental tensions between the two polar sides of the Eurasian grand supercontinent, connecting Western Europe (and also the United States across the Atlantic Ocean, further west) on one polar side, versus the Far East of Asia where China is centered on the other polar side, and Russia, as a land bridge between them then absorbing influences from both sides through its history over the last millennium. This great geophysical divide has been an important point in history of human conflict, in periods of war such as the great invasion of the Mongol hoards beginning in the thirteenth century, leading to the unification of today’s Russia, China, and Iran (ancient Persia) under the Mongol Empire. The Rise of the Islamic Empire in the seventh century also led to great conquest stretching from the east in China to Spain (Andalusia) in the West. Today, in the twenty-first century, we are experiencing similar challenges with rise of Islamic jihad for global caliphate and global social conflict in the East-West paradigm. In this article we shall examine this fundamental global social divide from the holistic view of Sociophysics, seeking to understand the dynamic behavior of human crowds in terms of complex system moved by physical, biological and social forces. This work further develops the theory presented in the 2019 article, “Solar Cycles, Light, Sex Hormones and The Life Cycles of Civilization: Toward Integrated Chronobiology”, which suggests sex and growth hormones, driven by seasonal solar patterns (chronobiology) are the driving force of human social dynamics. According to this view, solar energy levels reaching us as daylight determine human sex hormones levels, regulating our biological and sexual behavior, by driving human social mood trends and collective action, manifesting itself in the rhythm of human history from fall of civilization to a Dark Age of plagues pandemics and wars, to rebirth into a Renaissance leading to an age of Enlightenment. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/52 10.5281/zenodo.7740178 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/52/63 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/52/219 Copyright (c) 2023 Roy Barzilai https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/53 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:pfn

David Hume, Causation, and the Problem of Induction Lorkowski, Chris M. Hume Causation induction Scottish philosopher David Hume provided some of the most novel and important insights into the nature of causation.  This article introduces his most important lines of thought regarding cause and effect, specifically, his analysis of causation culminating in his two definitions of causation and the Problem of Induction. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/53 10.5281/zenodo.7740208 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/53/62 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/53/220 Copyright (c) 2023 Chris Lorkowski https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/54 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:hat

Physicists Don’t Understand Color Allsop, Brent objective consciousness subjective consciousness color vs. colorness colorness consciousness hard problem You can demonstrate a subjective quality like redness is different from red light.  If you add a device that converts a red signal into a green one,  between the retina and the optic nerve, the strawberry will seem green.  It’s not about light hitting the retina, it’s about how the signal is processed.  In this case, the greenness must be a quality of our conscious knowledge of  the strawberry, not of the red light landing on the retina. If you use sufficient, well defined terminology, you can objectively communicate the nature of subjective qualities. For example, even though you know what it is like to see something that is red you cannot know that what happens inside my brain is the same as yours. It may be that “My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red.” The properties of the red light are the same, but the experience the light produces could be different. What we lack is a universal dictionary to define what “redness” is, and how it differs from “red”. This is because physicists can’t yet answer: “Which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain, including possible descriptions of yet unknown processes, is a description of redness?”  Consciousness isn’t a ‘hard problem’ it is a color problem.  Because if you understand color, that model of computation can extend to the rest of consciousness. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/54 10.5281/zenodo.7740185 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/54/61 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/54/221 Copyright (c) 2023 Brent Allsop https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/57 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:rev

Theory of Mind, Phenomenology, and the Double Empathy Problem Rizzo, Elisabetta Angela theory of mind, phenomenology, double empathy problem, intersubjectivity, autism According to some neurocognitive studies, autistic people do not have a theory of mind (ToM); this means that they are unable to interpret the thoughts, beliefs and intentions of others just by observing their behaviour and/or listening to what they say and how they say it. By contrast, researchers from phenomenology claim that autistic people experience issues in earlier forms of intersubjectivity and that in some cases a ToM may be used to compensate for issues in empathy. My purpose is to present both the ToM account, along with its internal accounts (theory-theory, simulation theory, theory of mind mechanism), and an overview of phenomenology, followed by the presentation of some of the phenomenological counterarguments to ToM. Finally, I argue that both the neurocognitive approach and the phenomenological view seem to assume that issues reside in autistic people only and do not take into account the communication gap between autistic people and non-autistic people. As recent studies claim, autistic people are able to understand other autistic people, while they experience difficulties in communication when involved in intersubjective relations with non-autistic people. This mismatch between the two groups has been labelled the double empathy problem, and I propose that ToM and phenomenology may offer their support to this new perspective. AnKa :: publisher 2023-03-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/57 10.5281/zenodo.7740092 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/57/60 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/57/222 Copyright (c) 2023 Elisabetta Angela Rizzo https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/60 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:opper

The Infinite Self: A Philosophy on the Origin and Nature of Consciousness Breslauer, Sam consciousness non-dual nothingness information singularity infinite mind metaphysics God Creator Infinite Self The origin and nature of consciousness remains a deeply perplexing mystery for material scientists. Many material approaches towards the study of consciousness have been employed but have struggled to scratch beyond the surface of this strange yet intimately familiar phenomenon of the universe. This paper aims to provide a refreshingly new perspective that explains various theological, philosophical and physical interconnections that help solve the puzzle of consciousness. At the heart of this model is the notion that the material universe relies on the initial existence of an eternal Creator, whose central characteristic is Self-consciousness. It is the Self-love that emerges from the infinite consciousness of the Creator that provides the cause for ‘creation itself’ and explains how the differentiated material universe emerges from a unified immaterial origin. However, although creation relies on the primordial presence of the Creator, the Creator in turn relies on the existence of the infinite void of Nothingness. AnKa :: publisher 2023-04-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/60 10.5281/zenodo.7797350 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/60/72 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/60/223 Copyright (c) 2023 Sam Breslauer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/61 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:edit

A Look at the Future and an Open Call for Scientific Community Tarlacı, Sultan science neuroscience neurophilosophy mind brain What we call science is the systematization of information obtained from nature. Nature has had its own laws from the beginning. Some of these laws are easy to express, while others stretch our understanding and even our sense of logic. Our efforts to understand nature and its workings, that is our production of scientific knowledge, will never end. We may never truly understand the workings of nature, or get close to the real truth. Therefore, it is ridiculous to behave as if we knew all of the workings of nature and to say “this is not scientific; it is in conflict with the (known) laws of science”. The clearest example of this is when we see the workings of quantum physics in biological structures. When nature is working, it does not know the laws of our science and doesn’t even take notice of them. Nature even sometimes winks at us with “anomalies”. We learn from nature but we cannot impose on nature the laws we have learned from it. AnKa :: publisher 2023-04-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/61 10.5281/zenodo.7797340 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/61/59 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/61/224 Copyright (c) 2023 Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/62 2026-01-31T13:43:45Z jnp:edit

The Posterior Cingulate Cortex Again Forgotten Tarlacı, Sultan mind brain DLPFC cingulate cıetex repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation rTMS default mode network DMN precuneus Koch et al., (2022) 'Repetitive TMS applied to the precuneus stabilizes cognitive status in Alzheimer's disease,' we think that some findings are misunderstood and there are methodological problems. Neuromodulation approaches have been investigated for a long time in the treatment of Alzheimer's dementia. On the other hand, the precuneus region, which is the subject of the research, cannot be considered as an isolated region due to its close neighborhood. Precuneus, it is considered the main center of the default mode network (DMN) like the prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). To date, many DLPFC stimulation studies have been performed with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has been published. It is difficult to evaluate the effect claimed as a result of the research specific to the precuneus region. Theoretically, the effect can be expected with the excitation of any part of the default network. However, unlike previous rTMS studies that stimulated the DLPFC, the authors chose to stimulate the precuneus, the main center of DMN. AnKa :: publisher 2023-04-07 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/62 10.5281/zenodo.7812913 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/62/70 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/62/225 Copyright (c) 2023 Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/63 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:hat

The Cartesian Set Theory: A Unifying Theory for Mental Disorders Bucci, Andrea phenomenology transcendentalism psychoanalysis neurosciences mental disorders In this essay I want to propose a relative new theory about conscious states, human experience and its application in the study of mental disorders in the broader sense. I will call this theory, which has some similarities with the most famous Cartesian Theatre metaphor by Daniel Dennet, The Cartesian Set Theory. My Cartesian Set Theory try to reveal with the help of some analogies the entire field of human experience and, I retain obvious, the conscious one. Contextually, I will try to explain how the phenomenological inquiry overlap the biological studies about the brain functioning in psychiatric disorders. Immediately after, I will show how The Cartesian Set Theory can give a unifying vision of mental disorder, boundaries experience, and to predict new disorders. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/63 10.5281/zenodo.10200411 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/63/87 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/63/239 Copyright (c) 2023 Andrea Bucci https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/64 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:pfn

Brain Function on the Basis of Biological Equilibrium – The “Triggering Brain” Stueber, Juergen Biological equilibrium electromagnetism Brain function neronal representation actual information potential information self consciousness A model of brain function is presented that is consistently based on the biological principle of equilibrium. The neuronal modules of the cerebral cortex are proposed as units in which equilibrium between incoming signals and the synaptic structure is determined or established. Because of the electromagnetic activity of the brain, the electromagnetic properties of the cells are brought into focus. Due to the synaptic changes of the modules - essentially during sleep - an electromagnetic resting balance between the modules is established. Incoming signals during the day, disturb the electromagnetic resting equilibrium and are detected and understood by this. The connecting nodes within the neuronal network are given by the equilibrium modules. Incoming information is represented in the form of the specific pathway of the network, while recognized information is represented by the equilibrium states within the modules. The paper leads to an understanding of information storage and processing in the brain. It even provides a hypothesis for understanding the emergence of the "self". Finally, the consideration of electromagnetic wave properties of neurons opens up a biophysical starting point to understanding conscious perceptions. In neuroscience, we lack a unifying theory of the brain. The reason for this may be an important detail – a missing link – that we do not yet see. Following the "track of biological equilibrium" in this paper leads to the hypothesis that the electromagnetic properties of the neurons are potential candidates to fill that gap. A hypothesis is developed describing their physiological significance in the processing of neurological information. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/64 10.5281/zenodo.10203112 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/64/85 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/64/226 Copyright (c) 2023 Juergen Stueber https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/65 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:opper

Neurophenomenological Oeuvre in Large-Scale Networks: The Neural Dynamics of Subjective Experience Gande, Nathazsha neurophenomenology neurofeedback default-control network philosophy of mind executive function Neurophenomenology is a research program that seeks to integrate the fields of neuroscience and phenomenology for the purpose of investigating the nature of human experience. Contemporary neurocognitive models pertaining to self-regulation and execution suggests that individuals interpret objects they perceive and approach as definite in their experiential encounter. Yet, a comprehensive analysis on the phenomenology of awareness and behavior reveals that during the process of detecting or interacting with objects, we experience them in a convoluted manner that underlies an adversarial association of default and executive control networks. In this regard, numerous studies have invested in specific tasks involving creative-thinking that engage large-scale networks during artistic performance to understand the intricate cognitive processes of goal-oriented, self-generated thinking when subjects interact with objects and the world around them. This perspective provides a cognitive neuroscience lens on first-person narrative and third-person neural data co-development through the use of neurofeedback, aiming to enhance our understanding of the dynamic interplay between large-scale neural networks and acknowledges the challenges associated with the concurrent acquisition of both phenomenological and neuroscientific data. By doing so, research gaps and explanations for apparent discrepancies are elaborated, supporting executive function with a more in-depth phenomenological understanding of ourselves. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/65 10.5281/zenodo.10200290 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/65/79 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/65/227 Copyright (c) 2023 Nathazsha Gande https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/68 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:hat

A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Demmin, Herbert Phenomenology Philosophy Mind Brain Cognition Thinking A portion of a phenomenologically based model of thinking and conscious mental states called, A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought (TMDOT), is outlined (Demmin, 2015). Micro phases of occurrent thoughts (OTs) are delineated that consist of phenomenal contents in which a central executive (CE) becomes immersed, followed by one of several transitions of attention characterized by its “face up” or “face down” surfacing from them. The transitions bring about different degrees of consciousness of those contents, ones that reflect different forms of cognitive processing, revealing a relatively invariant structure that carries “on-line” cognition. In this article, it is shown that TMDOT can account for how self-consciousness develops out of object-consciousness during OTs, for how different degrees of object- and self-consciousness are engendered by the interaction of a CE (or minimal self) with different phase-based contents of the thought process, for how a gradually intensifying phenomenology of object- and self-consciousness are engendered within OTs, for a how a pulse-like phenomenology of object- and self-consciousness are engendered across OTs, and for an integrated CE that functions “within” the specious present and traverses the OT process. Significant cognitive and neuroscientific data appear to be consistent with phenomenological observations outlined in TMDOT and are incorporated into it. The integration of such data within the model appears to result in clarification, reinforcement, and validation of each other. A direction is offered for future neuroscientific research which may be able to establish a neurological link between consciousness of an object and pre-reflective self-consciousness embodied in a CE which is attending to that object, thereby validating (or not) the TMDOT proposal that a CE “moves” through phenomenal contents in two fundamentally different ways, each of which serves different cognitive functions that are necessary for the on-line processing of such contents and for different degrees of consciousness of that object. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/68 10.5281/zenodo.10202871 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/68/81 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/68/228 Copyright (c) 2023 Herbert Demmin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/69 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:opper

The Unreasonable Political Effectiveness of Mathematical Modelling Pockett , Susan nature of mathematics mathematical modelling uses of models epidemiology climatology economics brain models Ever since Thomas Malthus used simple mathematics to model the evolution of food production vs the increasing human population of planet Earth and declared that we would very soon eat ourselves out of house and home, politicians have been falling hook, line and sinker for mathematical models. This paper examines how and why the mathematical modelling of complex systems has proved unreasonably effective in convincing mathematically illiterate politicians to take practical measures that have turned out to be disastrous. It then suggests that mathematical modelling of the human brain is not a good strategy to pursue. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/69 10.5281/zenodo.10200253 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/69/78 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/69/229 Copyright (c) 2023 Susan Pockett https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/71 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:hat

The NeuroPhilosophy of Physics: A Grand Unification of How Brain and Mind Shape Our Perception of the Universe Barzilai, Roy Philosophy of physics free energy principle predictive mind neurotheology Cultural neuroscience The advancement of modern science, particularly in neuroscience and physics, may have reached the level of knowledge that enables us to be at the cusp of a new grand unified theory of the nature of our mind and how it shapes our perception of reality and evolution of science itself. This grand leap forward requires a paradigm shift towards greater integration of different scientific disciplines under the emerging new field of complex, dynamic systems, such as our brain and the universe, describing how the complex organization of matter is driven by energy flows. This new paradigm enables us to build a new scientific framework by exploring theories in philosophy, physics, biology and neuroscience; weaving them together into a holistic view of the human mind and the nature of physical reality, as in complex systems the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Throughout the history of philosophy the fundamental question of how the mind perceives reality has shaped its fundamental branches: metaphysics, considering the nature of reality, and epistemology, studying how our mind gains knowledge of reality. This article shall apply new theories in neuroscience, including neuroendocrinology and how it regulates the sociocultural evolution of civilization (Barzilai, 2019; 2023), and cognitive neuroscience, particularly the predictive mind paradigm and free energy principle, to explore the rise of modern science and physics since the Enlightenment, and gain better understanding of both neuroscience and physics. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/71 10.5281/zenodo.10200426 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/71/80 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/71/230 Copyright (c) 2023 Roy Barzilai https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/73 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:artic

The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of Discrete Normotypical and Pathological Modes: The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of States Fingelkurts, Andrew Fingelkurts, Alexander Kallio-Tamminen, Tarja Triad Model of Selfhood, Self-Me-I, Self-Referential Brain Network (SRN), Default-Mode Network (DMN), Subjective Sense of Self, First-Person Perspective, Electroencephalogram (EEG), Alpha Rhythm, Operational Synchrony, Functional Connectivity, Depersonalization Disorder (DD), Depression, Meditation, Depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Schizophrenia, Vegetative State (VS), Minimally Conscious State (MCS), Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) In this first-of-its-kind neurophenomenological study we investigated the dynamic configuration and the levels of variability of the “Self”-, “Me”-, and “I”- components that comprise a complex experiential Selfhood across 16 distinct modes covering a range of healthy-normal, altered, and pathological brain states. The phenomenology was addressed by examining the mental structures of subjective self-experience, and for the neurophysiological counterpart, we used electroencephalogram analysis to gather data on three subnets of the self-referential brain network that correspond to the three components of Selfhood. This methodological approach allowed us to uncover peculiarities and generalities in the dynamic of the Selfhood triad across a wide range of modes that could not be seen in a single study. We showed that any given Selfhood state is determined by varying proportions of “Self”, “Me”, and “I”-components depending on the phenomenological manifestation of a particular mode. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the “Self”-component has more leeway in expressing various pathological modes while having a very narrow window for variance in norm. The “I”-component, on the other hand, exhibits the opposite tendency, with a wide range of normal modes and only a narrow window for true pathological expression. Finally, the “Me”-component expresses a position intermediate between the “Self”- and “I”-components (though closer to the “I”-component). The findings are discussed with an emphasis on their theoretical, conceptual, philosophical, and clinical implications. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/73 10.5281/zenodo.10203089 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/73/84 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/73/231 Copyright (c) 2023 Andrew Fingelkurts, Alexander Fingelkurts, Tarja Kallio-Tamminen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/74 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:opper

The Dissolution of Dawkins’ Riddle Is Not So Hard Bucci, Andrea In this paper, I propose a metaphysics of group selection that solves the conundrum without appealing to the biological research in modern evolutionism but taking it in the background and citing it when needed. In my opinion, the group selection is practically possible and it does not contrast with the other fact, that natural selection involves individuals’ genes only. I propose this metaphysics as a reasoned narration of how the group selection works and I will show how the conundrum can be solved. The point seems to me that differently from what done till now, the description of the evolutionary mechanisms of individuals at the genes level must to correspond to the behaviour of individuals us such at least for what we know about it. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/74 10.5281/zenodo.10199809 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/74/75 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/74/232 Copyright (c) 2023 Andrea Bucci https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/75 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:hat

Mental Recognition of Objects via Ramsey Sentences: How does the Human Brain Recognize Dog? Tozzi, Arturo : theoretical terms; non-observable entity; sparce code; neural network, symbolic reasoning Dogs display vast phenotypic diversity, including differences in height, skull shape, tail, etc.  Yet, humans are almost always able to quickly recognize a dog, despite no single feature or group of features are critical to distinguish dogs from other objects/animals.  In search of the mental activities leading human individuals to state “I see a dog”, we hypothesize that the brain might extract meaningful information from the environment using Ramsey sentences-like procedures.  To turn the proposition “I see a dog” in a Ramsey sentence, the term dog must be replaced by a long and complex assertion consisting only of observational terms, existential quantifiers and operational rules.  The Ramsey sentence for “I see a dog” sounds: “There is at least an entity called dog which satisfies the following conditions: it is an animal, it has four legs, …, etc, …, and is something that I have in my sight”.  We discuss the biological plausibility and the putative neural correlates of a Ramsey-like mechanism in the central nervous system.  We accomplish a brain-inspired, theoretical neural architecture consisting of a parallel network that requires virtually no memory, is devoid of probabilistic choices and can analyze huge but finite amounts of unique visual details, combining them into a single conceptual output.  In sum, Ramsey sentence stands for a versatile tool that can be used not just as a methodological device to cope with biophysical affairs, but also for a model to describe the real functioning of cognitive operations such as sensation and perception. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/75 10.5281/zenodo.10202881 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/75/82 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/75/233 Copyright (c) 2023 Arturo Tozzi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/76 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:edit

Implications of Neuroscience for Ancient Traditional Philosophical Questions Tarlacı, Sultan neurophilosophy mind brain Patricia Churchland Neurophilosophy is an interdisciplinary field of study that combines neuroscience and philosophy to better understand the nature of the mind and consciousness. It is based on the idea that advances in our understanding of the brain can shed light on longstanding philosophical questions about the nature of the self, free will, consciousness, and the relationship between the mind and the body. At its core, neurophilosophy is concerned with exploring the relationship between the brain and the mind, and understanding how neural processes give rise to mental phenomena such as consciousness, perception, thought, and emotion. It also seeks to address broader philosophical questions related to the nature of the self, free will, and the relationship between mind and body. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/76 10.5281/zenodo.10199780 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/76/73 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/76/234 Copyright (c) 2023 Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/78 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:opper

In"tarot"ception – Primer, Learning Module, Philosophical Foundations and Application Bettinger, Jesse Perception; Interoception; Neurovisceral Axis; Predictive Coding; Free-Energy Principle; Bayesian Inference; Somatic Markers; Insula; Integrated Information; Tononi; Friston; Seth; Whitehead; Peirce Perception operates in general according to two causal processes—bottom-up (sensory driven; progressive), and top-down (anticipatory; inferential; with signal progression issuing from expectations about future states). Both are essential to consciousness. Like colors, there are, in essence, three primary modes of perception. Exteroception, interoception and proprioception. The interoceptive faculty of perception refers to the moment-to-moment awareness of the body's interior dynamics in concert with regulatory homeostatic and allostatic operations that furnish a core feature of subjective experience, social navigation and sense-of-self. This paper provides an overview of interoception accompanied by a visual diagram that serves as a heuristic learning model for conceptually organizing the materials. This follows with a summary of A.N. Whitehead's 'three modes of perception' that clarifies the connections with interoception to such an extent they may be regarded as philosophical foundations. This is followed by the topics of information integration and biological intuition. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/78 10.5281/zenodo.10200160 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/78/77 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/78/235 Copyright (c) 2023 Jesse Bettinger https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/79 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:hat

The Midbrain Attention-Orienting and Sensorimotor Control Module as an Neurobiological Basis for Scopesception: Superior Colliculus as a Neurophysiological Basis for Scopesception Bettinger, Jesse superior colliculus; inferior colliculus; corpora quadrigemina; scopaesthesia; eye-movement desensitization & reprocessing; multisensory facilitation; sensorimotor; salience network This article presents an update to existing literature regarding previous theoretical and experimental attempts to provide a biological basis for the everyday perceptual phenomenon of so-called "scopesception," "scopesthesia" or "staring-detection" — that sudden feeling of being stared-at that compels an automatic orientation of head and eyes to the stimulus. Protruding from the dorsal posterior midbrain, the superior colliculus functions as a sensorimotor processing and orienting module responsive to environmental stimuli. Given the superior colliculus constitutes an ancient visual processing and attention-control center for orienting head-and-eye responses and directing defensive behaviors, neurochemical and network attributes of the superior colliculus and extended circuitry indicate a capable platform for describing the signature components of scopesception. As to what specific mechanisms may register the directed-attention, two lines of reasoning are advanced involving multisensory facilitation/enhancement and the ecological psychoacoustics of subaudible vocalizations. In a clinical capacity, observational decreases of superior-colliculus-mediated saccades (linked to sensorimotor processing) during the therapeutic practice of "eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing" may motivate further etiological insight into biology of trauma and techniques for clinical alleviation of anxiety, hypervigilance and post-traumatic stress. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/79 10.5281/zenodo.10202949 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/79/83 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/79/236 Copyright (c) 2023 Jesse Bettinger https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/80 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:opper

The Infinite: A Cosmological Model Based on God's Self-consciousness Breslauer, Sam God consciousness singularity energy dimension fractal time cosmos density curvature This is the second of a series of three papers intended to recast and extend a philosophical and cosmological model, called the Fractal of Self (FOS) model of consciousness. The focus of this paper is to apply the theological / philosophical principles presented in the first paper, published in NeuroPhilosophy, and demonstrate how these axioms align with many discoveries made in the field of material science. As a result, this model proposes how creation began from a singularity of infinite energy density that contains the consciousness of God and manifests as a zero-dimensional point but then fulfills its potentiality and extends into a one-dimensional string. A fundamental premise of this model is that this singularity causes a fractal chain reaction of unending exponential dimensional development. This underlying pattern that begins with pure simplicity and continually creates a ‘hidden order’ of informational complexity, sequentially nested within and interconnected holographically to all actualized possibilities of the past, is the material perception that God’ consciousness creates, reflecting His immaterial infinite imagination. The paper begins by clarifying some points in relation to the previous paper then key features of this cosmological model are explained. The first four discrete moments of creation are then outlined in detail with the aid of a flow figure. This outline details how this great fractal is able to continually create new configuration of unique dimensions by fragmenting the original ‘string singularity’ in two opposing trajectories of evolvement. This dual contracting and expanding movement of the whole universe, which eternally divides ‘pure conscious energy’ towards increasing and decreasing energy densities simultaneously, allows creation to be perfectly balanced with exactly equal amounts of positive and negative energy that always cancels out to equal the dimensionality of the initial ‘point singularity’; zero. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/80 10.5281/zenodo.10199836 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/80/76 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/80/237 Copyright (c) 2023 Sam Breslauer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/81 2026-01-31T13:55:30Z jnp:rev

Neurobiology of the Milgram Obedience Experiment Eren Yavuz, Kudret Tarlacı, Sultan Milgram Obedience Experiment Neurobiology Authority and Obedience Empathy and Neuroscience This manuscript presents a comprehensive review of the neurobiology underlying the Milgram Obedience Experiment, a cornerstone in understanding human behavior under authority. Beginning with an examination of traumatic historical events, particularly the Holocaust, the manuscript delves into the psychological underpinnings of obedience. It discusses how individuals, like Adolf Eichmann, rationalized their actions as mere adherence to orders, a phenomenon later empirically studied by Stanley Milgram. Milgram's experiments, conducted at Yale University, demonstrated a startling willingness among ordinary people to inflict harm when instructed by an authority figure, with a significant proportion of participants administering what they believed were lethal electric shocks to others. The review further explores the neurobiological aspects of obedience, emphasizing the role of mirror neurons and empathetic responses. It highlights how obedience to authority can diminish empathetic responses and alter the neural processing of actions and consequences. This diminished sense of agency and responsibility when following orders is contrasted with situations where individuals act on their own volition, shedding light on the complex interplay between authority, morality, and neurobiology. In conclusion, this review not only provides a deep insight into Milgram's obedience experiments but also extends the understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms that drive human behavior in contexts of authority and obedience. It underscores the intricate balance between individual autonomy and susceptibility to external influences, a balance that is crucial in understanding both historical events and contemporary societal dynamics. AnKa :: publisher 2023-11-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/81 10.5281/zenodo.10199797 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/81/74 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/81/238 Copyright (c) 2023 Kudret Eren Yavuz, Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/83 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:opper

Integrated Information Theory 4.0 is both Weakly Panpsychist and Strongly Dualist, but many Theories of Consciousness are also Prone to It Yurchenko, Sergey B. Since its first formulation the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) has recently been updated to the version 4.0. Unlike the previous versions where the problem of free will was completely neglected, IIT 4.0 claims to suggest a full neuroscientific account of this oldest problem in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this opinion paper is to show that IIT’s account of free will is apparently dualist and reminiscent of the conventional free will in folk psychology, where mental constructs such as beliefs and desires are regarded as actual causes of human actions. On the other hand, these mental constructs can have high predictive power, compared to that provided by neuroscience. Thus, while rejecting ontological dualism, one can accept methodological dualism, compatible with eliminative physicalism, by virtue of its predictive power and descriptive parsimony. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/83 10.5281/zenodo.10877331 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/83/88 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/83/240 Copyright (c) 2024 Sergey B. Yurchenko https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/84 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:opper

Acting on What You are Perceiving: The Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis Revisited: Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis Revisited Zhao, Bin The two-visual-systems hypothesis proposed by Goodale and Milner is a radical one. If it were to be true, then our common sense such as we are acting on what we are perceiving should be completely abandoned. In this paper, I argue that the hypothesis over-generalizes what happens in simple tasks to what happens in complex tasks. By contrast, I demonstrate that what happens in complex tasks is compatible with our common sense. In a word, though what we are acting on may come apart from what we are perceiving in some cases, that is not the whole story. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/84 10.5281/zenodo.10874499 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/84/89 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/84/241 Copyright (c) 2024 Bin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/85 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:hat

Model of the Neuronal World as a Complete Explanation of Empirical Reality: A model of the world and a self-model created by any brain Kondrat, Vladislav neurophilosophy model of the neuronal world neuronal world brain rhythms self-model neuronal space neuronal causality the model of the world illusionism The brain has been the subject of scientific inquiry for centuries, yet we continue to unravel its mysteries. One of the most intriguing questions is how the brain creates a perception of reality. The Neurophilosophical model of the Neuronal World (NWM) is a scientific theory that explains how the brain makes a neural model of the world and a self-model through wave synchronization of neurons in the connectome. The NWM includes illusionism, which explains that the phenomenal character of consciousness is an illusion. The NWM proposes two basic models of the neuronal world: a model of the world and a self-model created by any brain. Understanding the self-model is crucial to gaining insight into the brain's workings. The NWM refutes the notion of the existence of consciousness, explaining that this concept does not reflect the accurate picture of how the brain creates a virtual model of reality. By exploring the NWM, we can gain insight into the workings of the brain and its role in creating perception of reality, which can have an impact on various fields, including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/85 10.5281/zenodo.10874649 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/85/92 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/85/245 Copyright (c) 2024 Vladislav Kondrat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/86 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:hat

Cosmological Neuroscience on the Relationship Between the Evolutionary Levels of Consciousness and the Multidimensional Nature of Soul: Consciousness as the neural environment of Soul Ludvig, Nandor consciousness animal soul human soul noospheric soul Soul of Multiverse While the nature of Consciousness is one of the most intensely debated subjects of current neuroscience, the nature of Soul is hardly represented in the textbooks of the field, if represented at all. As a consequence, the relationship between the two phenomena remains unclear. This work took a look into that relationship from the vantage point of cosmological neuroscience. The following concept emerged: Consciousness seems to be the evolutionary product of a cosmic blueprint for animal central nervous systems allowed to become neural environments sensing the host’s body and surrounding world to such extent that these neural environments once could house the distinct cellular network of the Animal Soul, which, evolving further, gave rise to the leap of the Human Soul with its prefrontal cortical neural supercircuitry now creating the digitized Noospheric Soul with its potential to sense its cosmic origin. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/86 10.5281/zenodo.10874785 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/86/90 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/86/242 Copyright (c) 2024 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/87 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:opper

Hegel’s Wasteland: Situating T.S. Eliot’s Representations of History in Conversation with Hegel: Eliot’s Representations of History in Conversation with Hegel Moscetti, Virginia literary criticism hegel philosophy of history teleology T.S. Eliot Poetry In this paper, I argue that T.S. Eliot’s whirlpool motif and characterization of the prophet Tiresias in his poem “The Waste Land” engage with and problematize Hegel’s teleological conception of human history. As I suggest, Tiresias, through his sexual plasticity and historical moveability, undermines both prongs of Hegel’s dialectic, Spirit and Nature, while the whirlpool motif subverts the idea that history’s temporal progression can be subordinated to a dialectical logic. Since Hegel’s teleological doctrine situates Europe at the apex of humanity’s rational development, I ultimately conclude that Eliot’s whirlpool and Tiresias reveal Europe’s post-war anxiety about its exceptionalist self-image. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/87 10.5281/zenodo.10874331 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/87/91 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/87/243 Copyright (c) 2024 Virginia Moscetti https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/88 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:opper

Rhythm in Music, Encoded in Neural Networks, and in the Mind von Domburg, Peter Rhythm in music, neural networks, artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, encoded information, Gestalt, intentionality. Rhythm is ubiquitous in nature and has fascinated scholars from times immemorial. Rhythmic activity also underlies many forms of communicative interaction both in biology and in artificial computational systems. A rapidly growing issue, both in technology and philosophy, is whether this kind of communicative interaction from the most sophisticated applications of artificial intelligence (AI) is comparable to the interaction of human beings and their minds. A now historic debate on this quickly suffers from exceeding the limits that must be imposed on the use of terms from different reference domains, like the concept of intentionality and the emergence of conscious representations in a mental world. In this paper rhythm in music, with its characteristic roots in a culture, is explored as a representation of encoded information with particular Gestalt character, but meanwhile, in the composition of modulated frequencies, also comparable to the oscillatory activity in neural networks. Rhythm in music is a complex phenomenon and the carrier or “medium” of meaningful representations, while it can ultimately be traced back to modulated oscillations in sound waves, the auditory system and related sensorimotor and information supporting networks in the brain. The phenomenon of rhythm in music is explored, in such a way that it becomes clear why it can serve as an illustrative representation for the comparison of “intelligence” in the living brain and that in AI. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/88 10.5281/zenodo.10874430 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/88/93 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/88/94 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/88/244 Copyright (c) 2024 Peter Domburg https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/92 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:BR

Posthuman Views of Mind in Life Liu, Tongwei Jin, Xinzhe Dong, Da Chen, Wei the biotic view of mind the life-mind continuity thesis autopoiesis artificial intelligence post-humanism cyborg the third culture In this article, we provide a book review on Hengwei Li’s new book, "The Biotic View of Mind and Issues of Posthuman Society." The author presents a groundbreaking perspective, the biotic view of mind, which is known as the strong continuity view within the life-mind continuity thesis, resonating with pragmatism and predictive processing theory. Furthermore, this viewpoint is extended to the real-life context on intelligent technology and the forms of posthuman society, offering valuable insights for navigating the development of future society. Lastly, the author addresses the opposition and conflicts between the "two cultures" in cognitive science and proposes three potential solutions to this existing predicament. Given that this book spans philosophy, biology, psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, we believe it can inspire researchers and advanced students alike. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/92 10.5281/zenodo.10875091 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/92/95 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/92/246 Copyright (c) 2024 Tongwei Liu, Xinzhe Jin, Da Dong, Wei Chen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/94 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:ns

Crucial Philosophical Implications of Neuroplasticity Peluffo, Lucas neurophilosophy neuroplasticity mind-body dualism evolution empathy compassion loving-kindness This article briefly reviews neuroplasticity's basic terms and mechanisms and then emphasizes three crucial philosophical implications. (1) Considering the relationship of epistemology with the brain, the main organ of human intelligence is now proven to have the capacity to reorganize itself structurally. (2) Neuroplasticity has startled metaphysicians by embodying a mechanism that appears to challenge any strict—non-interactive—interpretations of the controversial term mind-body dualism. (3) Within morality and ethics, many neuroscientific studies performed on Buddhist meditators of Indic meditative traditions have linked positive neuroplasticity with empathy, compassion, and loving-kindness, indicating that these qualities can be developed consciously and suggesting that they may be intrinsic to human beings. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/94 10.5281/zenodo.10875054 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/94/96 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/94/247 Copyright (c) 2024 Lucas Peluffo https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/95 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:opper

The Brain is within the Self and Not Our Entire Self Zand, Hamid This article explores the true nature of the "self" by excusing the human fear of death and historical attempts to uncover immortality. The human desire for immortality motivates us to study the nature of the self in order to keep it as much as possible. However, the factors that influence self and self-awareness are very complex, and some of them vary each time. Therefore, self-perception changes over time, and recreating it without considering these factors through newly proposed approaches, such as mind uploading or copying the mind into a new brain, may be a challenging endeavor. It seems that despite the complexity and importance of neural networks, the brain cannot fully explain self-awareness. Self-awareness is an emergent property of the brain that arises from its interaction with a set of variable factors that form each moment. AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/95 10.5281/zenodo.10874539 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/95/97 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/95/248 Copyright (c) 2024 Hamid Zand https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/98 2026-01-31T14:06:32Z jnp:BR

Neurowaves and the Nature of Temporality Hu, Ye Liu, Tongwei Dong, Da Chen, Wei neurowaves time perception neural mechanisms time coordination world-brain relationship In this article, we provide a book review on Georg Northoff’s “Neurowaves: Exploring the Dynamic Nature of Time in the Brain.” It is a groundbreaking exploration of the intricate relationship between the brain and time. Drawing on spatiotemporal neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, and contemporary physics, Northoff metaphorizes time as waves, unraveling the complex interplay between duration and moments in time. The book extends these time waves to elucidate state transitions in brain and mind dynamics, emphasizing the holistic connection between the brain, environment, and mindfulness. Northoff argues that understanding how the brain operates in its environment is essential for comprehending the impact of brain-world-time relationships on the mind. Notably, Northoff underscores the significance of the brain’s internal sense of time in shaping psychological traits, emphasizing the pivotal role of spontaneous brain activity in bridging brain functions and the mind AnKa :: publisher 2024-03-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/98 10.5281/zenodo.10875121 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/98/98 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/98/249 Copyright (c) 2024 Ye Hu, Tongwei Liu, Da Dong, Wei Chen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/100 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:opper

Freedom under Naturalistic Dualism Macías, Arturo free will, naturalistic dualism, time asymmetry This article explores the issue of freedom in the framework of naturalistic dualism. Given that for physicalism the Universe is no more than the execution of the mechanical (either deterministic or stochastic) laws of Physics, reality is chance and necessity. On the other hand, consciousness is immediately real. By evaluating the set of possible futures conditional on their own actions a subject builds a legitimate mental object that is the scope of their "freedom". The existence of free will depends on the fact that the future cannot be remembered. The philosophical relevance of a better scientific understanding of time asymmetry is underscored and it is conjectured that it is related to the existence of fundamental (ontic) randomness in the fundamental Laws of Physics. The article closes with a short discussion on the moral consequences of this vision: the abhorrence that evil deeds produce is justified in absence of causative agency because they signal an unworthy conscious perpetrator. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/100 10.5281/zenodo.14272517 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/100/103 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/100/265 Copyright (c) 2024 Arturo Macías https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/102 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:opper

The Perceptual Mechanics of Consciousness that Evolves Life Towards an Ever-refining Image of God Breslauer, Sam consciousness God embodiment life memory values attention information fractal perception This is the third and final paper in presenting the Fractal of Self model of consciousness, which focuses on the natural consequence of Infinite Self (IS) / God developing an ever-increasingly complex material perception (creation) that His Self-consciousness becomes embodied, as life itself. IS thus creates worldly conditions that allows oneself to act through a multitude of diverse biological bodies that each create a unique objective perception of the created world. Each creature, along with their embodied experience, is providentially guided by IS’s foreknowledge of all possible expressions of information that already exist immaterially in His eternal mind beyond creation. The Fractal of Self model proposes that the complex functionality and order of informational sequences within RNA and DNA, that act as fully formed instructions for the construction life, is the micro-physical medium in which IS collapses His embodied designs into the physical world. Because creation reflects IS’s identity, life, upon inception, is naturally imbued with self-value. This internal self-valuing system expresses itself in the form of the Values of Life; the need to keep experience alive for self and others of the same specie group via fulfilling goals related to survival and reproduction. This internal value system, that upholds and interconnects life as a whole united structure, is inwardly felt by individuals through positive and negative sensations that, in turn, control one’s attention towards highly relevant informational patterns that either threaten or promote the fulfillment of the Values of Life. Important life experiences are recorded as memories of significance and are remembered with the inner-sensations present at the time, which allows one’s internal value system to discern and rank-order experiences, storing highly valued emotionally charged memories at the top of one’s memory / mind hierarchy for easy future recall. Essentially, these perceptual mechanics are controlled by the need to experience homeostasis and is also responsible for the continual evolution of competence and intelligence within the kingdom of life AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/102 10.5281/zenodo.14272480 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/102/100 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/102/266 Copyright (c) 2024 Sam Breslauer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/106 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:opper

Spinoza’s Mind in Modern Affective Neuroscience J Miller, Edward Spinoza dual aspect monism neuroscience philosophy mind brain The increasing popularity of affective neuroscience lends itself to more authors utilizing Spinoza’s dual aspect monism as their philosophical backbone. However, it is important that if Spinoza’s work is to be incorporated in this manner, a thorough understanding of his philosophy is maintained, particularly the way that Spinoza relates mind, brain and his understanding of God (Universal Substance). This perspective piece gives a brief overview of Spinoza’s work, mainly from Ethics, and discusses how his complex theories may be easily misinterpreted by modern authors. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/106 10.5281/zenodo.14377755 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/106/120 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/106/264 Copyright (c) 2024 Edward https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/109 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:artic

The Modular with Feedback: Theory of Free Will Lugten, Peter Free Will Modular Feedback Inverse compatibilism Plastic control In this theoretical article, I propose free will to be compatible, not with determinism, but with chance. This paper provides a neurological model of how free will emerges from oscillating neuronal activity, in modules. These, representing ideas, oscillate subconsciously, competing for conscious attention; choice between them is partly random. The modules seek to maintain, homeostatically, a sense of context and consistency; and a conscious desire for a sense of character and personality. I propose that they learn from experience, using feedback to rebalance, so that decisions conform to our desired will. This applies to "snap" decisions, but also to our moral core. Particular experiences influence our future moral judgments such that we accept responsibility for our generally but not entirely predictable decisions. The model explains will power, pathologies (i.e., addiction, “ego-depletion”) and links free will to creativity and humor. The Modular with Feedback theory of free will grants us freedom through a plastic control the uncertainty of which isn’t understood, but which is sufficient to preclude determinism. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/109 10.5281/zenodo.14272651 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/109/109 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/109/263 Copyright (c) 2024 Peter Lugten https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/110 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:hat

Default Mode Network as the Neurophysiological Groundwork of Collectivity Ceylan, Mehmet Emin Kaya Yertutanol, Fatma Duygu Dönmez, Aslıhan Önen Ünsalver, Barış default mode network collectivity collective-self neurophilosophy All newborns are born with a collective self that carries the traces of the selves of all humans who lived before them, and then form their individual self over the collective self in the light of the experience and information they gathered by themselves. This library of knowledge in question can be reached for a short time during sleep and mind-wandering. Easy access to this great source of knowledge requires that the archive in question is recorded in a neural network that has widespread projections in the brain. In our opinion, the best candidate for this is default mode network due to its neurophysiological and neuroanatomical characteristics. In this article, default mode network is discussed as a dynamic neural archive, which carries all the knowledge of humanity and the concept of collectivity is discussed with a philosophical point of view on the basis of neuroscience. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/110 10.5281/zenodo.14272596 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/110/115 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/110/262 Copyright (c) 2024 Mehmet Emin Ceylan, Fatma Duygu Kaya Yertutanol, Aslıhan Dönmez, Barış Önen Ünsalver https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/111 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:artic

The Rocky Road Towards Defining the Mind Skansi, Sandro Mind Dualism Mental Phenomena Computation Cybernetics Logic This study scrutinizes the essence of intelligence through the lens of search theory, enriched by philosophical insights and computational paradigms. We critically analyze Herbert Simon's foundational idea of intelligence as search, revealing its limitations in capturing the complexity of human cognition. Emphasizing the role of imagination – a neglected aspect – we explore how it simplifies intricate realities by reshaping search spaces through conceptual frameworks and classifications. Our exploration navigates between materialistic reductionism and dualist views of the mind, scrutinizing neural mechanisms versus the intuitive aspects of mental phenomena. Ultimately, we advocate for an integrated perspective of intelligence that goes beyond algorithmic problem-solving to embrace creativity and the nuanced depths of human thought. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/111 10.5281/zenodo.14272629 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/111/107 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/111/261 Copyright (c) 2024 Sandro Skansi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/112 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:opper

A Handle on Consciousness: The Asymmetry of Consciousness Goutos, George neuroscience, consciousness, sentience, symmetry, quantum, spacetime, solipsism The mystery of consciousness, especially the question of how we each experience our own unique, first-person perspective, is something that has perplexed scientists for centuries and philosophers for millennia. In the vast complexity of the human brain is a three-pound universe teeming with neurons and synapses. Yet somehow, amidst all this biological machinery, emerges the wondrous phenomenon of consciousness. This raises not one, but two intriguing puzzles. First, there's the symmetric challenge: Why would any physical state become sentient? It's like asking why any light bulb, plugged into any socket, suddenly glows. But the asymmetric challenge is where things get more personal and perplexing: Why does my specific, individual first-person perspective exist at all? Why do I experience my thoughts and my feelings? That’s like asking why does one specific light bulb represent ‘me’? This exploration delves into this enigma, highlighting the inherent uniqueness of each person's first-person perspective. It’s evident that we have no current theories that even come close to an explanation. We need a robust theory, one that will not only explain consciousness but can also fully explain the distinct and deeply personal nature of individual consciousness. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/112 10.5281/zenodo.14272501 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/112/101 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/112/260 Copyright (c) 2024 George Goutos https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/114 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:ns

The Role of Consciousness and Emotion in Decision-making: A NeuroPhilosophical Perspective Nambiar, Akanksha brain mind Humans engage in a complex array of metacognitive activities in their daily lives. These mainly involve being aware consciously or unconsciously while deciding on a particular action, which is fundamental to human existence. Humans acquire a unique skill of observing societal nuances, expressing their opinions, feeling a range of emotions, and choosing the actions that reflect their identity. The paper aims to comprehend the fundamental aspects of consciousness and human emotional decision-making, which are influenced by socio-economic factors. This will be presented in three ways: first, it will explain the intricacies involved in decision-making science and behavioural outcomes. Second, the theoretical models and themes will explain the socio-economic factors influencing the emotional components of humans. Thus, this compromises an individual's decision-making skills. Third, an experimental representation of consciousness and decision-making models by scientists- Antonio Damasio and Stanislas Dehaene. This will hold the essentiality of modern outlook, tools, and methods adopted in Psychology and Neuroscience to perceive consciousness and decision science differently. Lastly, the paper highlights a comprehensive theoretical and empirical investigation of factors compounding the consciousness, socio-economic and emotional decision-making of humans. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/114 10.5281/zenodo.14272695 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/114/112 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/114/259 Copyright (c) 2024 Akanksha Nambiar https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/118 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:opper

The Controversy Over Physicalism vs. Non-physicalism: Which One Is More Supported? Winston, Kevin consciousness physicalism non-physicalism popularity debate Physicalism and non-physicalism are the two dominant ideas currently being used to propose explanations for consciousness. However, a final consensus for an explanation of the basis of consciousness has not yet been achieved. This study analyzes the current viewpoints of physicalism and non-physicalism and the weaknesses of these viewpoints in order to determine which argument, if any, is more likely to comprise a definitive explanation for consciousness in the future. It assesses the popularity of each argument and the possible future direction for the overall debate. The study results suggest that physicalism is more popular than non-physicalism, although non-physicalism is expected to grow as an argument in the future in the debate. This indicates that a new explanation for consciousness that incorporates the ideas of both physicalism and non-physicalism may be developed. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/118 10.5281/zenodo.14272443 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/118/99 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/118/258 Copyright (c) 2024 Kevin Winston https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/119 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:artic

The Absolute Otherness of Authentic Human Identity as a Ghost in a Machine: The Otherness of the Human Soul in a Cyborg Body, Heterocognition and Qualia Güder, Feride Zeynep absolute otherness, augmented intelligence, artificial consciousness, algorithmic surveillance, hive mind, human enhancement technologies, transhumanistic solitude Descartes' philosophical arguments about the dual nature of the human mind and body were modified by Ryle to suggest that the authentic human soul is a ghost in the machine. Authentic human intelligence and mind have been targeted for invasion by neurotechnological innovations such as HET (Human Enhancement Technologies) and NBIC (Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Sciences). The study focuses on the vulnerability of individual human consciousness as it converges with the artificial collective consciousness and aims to discuss the otherness of humans and their futile attempts to escape the hive mind as artificial consciousness. The ghost of human memory and authentic identity is now forced to cooperate with the collective consciousness as a machine. As Artificial Intelligence or Artificial Consciousness surpasses the capacity of normal human intelligence, staying outside of these algorithmic innovations and high AI technologies is challenging as new types of 'others' emerge and seek their points of escape and resistance. Therefore, the normal search for solitude and privacy has a different orientation and nature than the technological invasion. This otherness is the absolute otherness of the human being in the face of the challenges of the hive mind, the latest version of artificial intelligence, artificial consciousness, and big data. The study gives some examples of escape practices from a dystopian science fiction film, Ghost in the Shell, where the authentic human soul and identity are trapped in the shell of a cyborg body, and this transhumanist loneliness and otherness is explored through theoretical arguments. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/119 10.5281/zenodo.14272621 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/119/117 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/119/257 Copyright (c) 2024 Feride Zeynep Güder https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/121 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:artic

Memory of Existing Objects as a Fundamental Idea in the Metaphysics and Ontology of Fictional Entities Leyva Pizano, Arturo Memory Creativity Imagery Recall Materialism Analytic philosophers have long debated about whether fictional characters exist. Fictional antirealists argue that fictional entities are not part of the objects that exist; fictional realists believe that fictional entities do exist. Drawing on recent neuroscientific developments, I make the case here for fictional realism. I review the neuroscientific evidence that memory functions not only to remember the past but to prepare for the future by rearranging the components of past experiences to permit anticipation of future scenarios. Both imagery (neural representations of objects not present in the environment) and imagination (production of novel neural images during waking and sleep) rely on retrieval of memories of previous experiences. I argue that the creation of a fictional character (e.g., Jane Austen creating Emma Woodhouse) involves the recombination of memories and images from the author’s biographical experience. Thus, fictional characters are ontologically dependent not just on the material objects containing their stories (e.g., books, films) but also on the real objects/individuals that the author rearranges to form the fictional entity. My theory explains how this rearrangement of previously existing elements can create something new without relying on the idea of pretence, as all elements of the fictional entity derive from persons or objects existing in the real world. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/121 10.5281/zenodo.14272660 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/121/121 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/121/256 Copyright (c) 2024 Arturo Leyva Pizano https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/122 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:pfn

Blur and Knowledge from Falsehood: Neural Network Science and Neurophysiology Meets Epistemology Azzouni, Jody convolutional neural nets knowledge because of falsehoodsehood knowledge from falsehood peripheral blur Gettier cases Hilpinen cases Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) trained on clear images fail catastrophically with degraded or blurry imagery. New results by Jang and Tong, and Pramod, Katti and Arun show visual object recognition is optimized by introducing peripheral blur. Optimizing recognition of objects this way empirically supports the significance of there being a hundred times less photoreceptors dedicated for peripheral vision than in the retina. These results refute a longstanding epistemic slogan: Knowledge of truths arises only from knowledge of truths. Blur-trained CNNs and humans recognize things in blurry, degraded and noisy environments—a dog, a radiator—that clear-image-trained CNNs don’t. Blurring is misinformation about what is seen, so the human perceptual system recognizes objects by processes that start from falsehood. Peripheral blur—misinformation about what is seen—is essential to perceptual knowledge. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/122 10.5281/zenodo.14272677 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/122/111 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/122/255 Copyright (c) 2024 Jody Azzouni https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/123 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:lett

Self-localisation without Property Dualism Khuramy, Mustafa mind-body problem philosophy of mind neurophiloosphy out-of-the-body experience dualism In this journal, Bucci (2022) has argued that two famous experiments in the neuroscientific literature can be used to support property dualism about the mind. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate that those experiments are completely compatible with a naive identity mind-brain/body identity theory. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/123 10.5281/zenodo.14272709 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/123/119 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/123/254 Copyright (c) 2024 Mustafa Khuramy https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/124 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:hat

Is Low Solar Energy Causing Reduction in Serotonin and Leading to the Obesity and Mental Health Crisis? Barzilai, Roy chronobiology mental health sex hormones ketogenic diet obesity epidemic We are living in a historical period in respect to the deterioration in public health, as we experience the rise of the catastrophic obesity epidemic and mental health crisis in recent decades, despite the great efforts from the scientific and medical community to seek health solutions and to try to find cures to the enormous human suffering and economic costs resulting by this collapse in public health. This trend has reached such a critical level that it jeopardizes society when over 40% of the population is obese in the United States, suffering grave medical health conditions, even as the expenditure on public health is rising exponentially to over 20% of gross domestic product. This should point to a monumental failure in our fundamental understanding of basic human biology and health. This article suggests that our current Western reductionist scientific paradigm in both biology and medicine has proved impotent and failed us completely. Therefore, the current cultural health crises require a more holistic approach to human biology and health in terms of chronobiological trends. The emerging neuroscience of brain energy metabolism will be considered as a holistic model for understanding how solar cycles affect our civilization and drive our sex and growth hormones and neurotransmitters that shape both our physical and mental health. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/124 10.5281/zenodo.14272583 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/124/104 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/124/253 Copyright (c) 2024 Roy Barzilai https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/126 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:CSA

1st International Neurophilosophy Symposium November 29, 2024, Üsküdar University, İstanbul, Türkiye International Neurophilosophy Symposium Organizing Committee The 1st International Neurophilosophy Symposium has successfully concluded, and we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to all participants. Below is a list of the distinguished speakers and their insightful presentations. We deeply appreciate the engaging discussions and the exchange of knowledge that enriched this event. Thank you for making it a success! Prof. Dr. Patricia Churchland, the global authority in neurophilosophy, was the main speaker of the symposium, while Prof. Dr. Sultan Tarlacı, who conducts scientific studies in this field, was also among the symposium speakers. Üsküdar University Founding President Prof. Dr. Nevzat Tarhan said that "neurophilosophy is a new field and that much new information will emerge in this field".  At the symposium, Prof. Dr. Lütfü Hanoğlu “Philosophy for Neuroscience, Neuroscience for Philosophy; Cognitive Ontology”, Dr. Saffet Murat Tura “The Penfield Experiment and Neils Bohr's Complementarity Principle: An Epistemological Approach to the Problem of Consciousness”, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zeynep Talay Turner “Philosophy of Emotions and Neurophilosophy”, Dr. Merve Arlı Özekes “Neurophilosophy and the Question of Well-Being in Aristotle's Thought”, Dr. Lecturer M. Kaan Özkan “A Neurophilosophical Essay on the Origin of Phenomenal Experience”, Doğa Merve Karataş “Neurophilosophy: A Common Language for Philosophy of Mind and Neuroscience” and Dr. Lecturer Baver Demircan “Neurophilosophy and Social Consciousness” gave a talk. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-04 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/126 10.5281/zenodo.14272733 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/126/114 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/126/270 Copyright (c) 2024 Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/127 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:ns

Piketty’s Summarized Ideas on Social Inequality in the View of Cosmological Neuroscience Ludvig, Nandor wealth social inequality human brain motivational system soul cosmic program The present article placed in the framework of cosmological neuroscience the book titled “Nature Culture, and Inequality’’ by Thomas Piketty, the French economist and sociologist. According to Piketty, it is culture and politics that explains the diversity, degree, and structure of social inequalities, whereas the importance of natural factors, such as personal talents and reserves of natural resources, is relatively limited. In contrast, this article argued that the perhaps cosmically programmed evolution of the human brain is the real, though hopefully transient, determinant of social inequality. The relevant specific message of this paper is that it is the evil side of the evolutionary force of socialization on the human brain’s emotionally and cognitively assisted Motivational system that is responsible for abnormal social inequality across the globe, throughout history. However, agreeing with Piketty, this paper also emphasized that social inequality depends on who controls the government and to what end. The article stood by its author’s previously published opinion that just societies with minimized, therefore socially welcomed and never abused, inequalities can be built only via a Government of Earth responsible, besides governing, for running an intercontinental education system able to train social leaders with equal moral and intellectual excellence, disinterest in personal financial gains, and understanding the cosmic contexts of human history. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-09 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/127 10.5281/zenodo.14330769 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/127/118 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/127/251 Copyright (c) 2024 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/128 2026-02-02T09:29:00Z jnp:BR

A Critical Review of Determined: Life Without Free Will: Author: Robert M. Sapolsky, Penguin Press, 2023, 528 pages Whittaker, Max free will personal responsibility determinism scientific knowledge neurobiology The current paper critically appraises Robert Sapolsky’s recent popular science book, Determined (2023). Sapolsky’s basic claim is that there is much less scope for free will than many intuitively imagine, though book’s subtitle makes clear that free will is viewed as a wholly untenable concept. If there is no scientific basis for free will, Sapolsky argues, there is no basis for individual culpability, and little basis for society be organised around this principle. Modern forms incarceration, laden with notions of personal culpability, are thus unjustified. An instrumental use of quarantine, stripped of notions of guilt and shame, would represent a more rational, scientific approach towards those who behave dangerously. In response, the current review argues that the existence of free will is largely irrelevant to the question of individual responsibility. It also questions whether it is self-evident that society should be based upon a modern scientific understanding of human behaviour, while further arguing that scientific knowledge emerges from a professional culture grounded in individual accountability. Some cautionary reflections are then offered which challenge Sapolsky’s belief that more humane and compassionate societies will emerge if we dispense with notions of free will and personal culpability. Lastly, it will be argued that attributions of guilt and shame may not be wholly corrosive forces, but may in fact be instrumental in the maintenance stable and humane forms of human organisation. AnKa :: publisher 2024-12-23 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/128 10.5281/zenodo.14546708 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/128/122 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/128/250 Copyright (c) 2024 Max Whittaker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/134 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:hat

What If the Ontological Basis of Consciousness are Quantum Exclusions? Paciello, Arrigo quantum ontology, quantum exclusions, phenomenal consciousness, logical supervenience, nonlocal EPR-like affections, highly integrated historical constructs, quantum Zeno effect The aim of this paper is to advance a new hypothesis on the ontological correspondence between the quantum alternatives excluded from actualization in the quantum measurement (“collapse of the wave function”) and micro-phenomenal facts. Just as Heisenberg identified quantum potentia as a new type of ontological state distinct from the actualized state, it is a matter of conceiving a third type of ontological state, distinct from both the potential state and the actualized state. While Heisenberg's quantum potentia is distinguished as a superposition of potential space-time outcomes, the third type of ontological state, the quantum exclusion state, can be defined as a state of space-time outcomes annihilation. We can also conceive of quantum exclusions as Everettian branches that, deprived of physical quantities due to the collapse of the wave function, assume only phenomenal qualities. Quantum exclusions seem to be the only entities/states involved in the quantum measurement process, which are naturally supervenient but not logically supervenient on the actualized states (space-time events). Therefore, compared with Heisenbergian quantum potentiae, quantum exclusions might have fundamental advantages as the ontological basis of consciousness, as the “place of consciousness,” in terms of less vulnerability to Chalmers' conceivability arguments (e.g., zombie argument, inverted spectra argument), and most importantly because they do not exhibit the feature that makes quantum potentiae irreconcilable with our phenomenological evidence, namely superposition. AnKa :: publisher 2025-03-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/134 10.5281/zenodo.15004018 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/134/127 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/134/178 Copyright (c) 2025 Arrigo Paciello https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/141 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:opper

A Phenomenological 4E Eliminative Materialism: Consciousness as Neuromuscular Adaptation “In Virtue of Which” Movement Affordances are Disclosed Leyva Pizano, Arturo cognition consciousness eliminative materialism mind body brain Traditional eliminative materialism has argued that folk-psychological constructs such as belief, desire, or sensation do not correspond to scientifically-real entities. However, eliminativist writing discourse has mostly focused on a purely brain-centered model, with limited clarity on how bodily and environmental factors fit into an ontologically radical perception of the mind. This paper proposes a phenomenological 4E eliminative materialism, drawing on both Rowlands’ arguments for extended, embodied cognition as well as my own focus on neuromuscular adaptation as the basis of consciousness. I argue that “consciousness” should be understood not as mental content but as a fully material phenomenon, realized in the evolving, body-plus-environment synergy “in virtue of which” affordances are disclosed. This perspective dissolves the distinction between “mind” and “body” and even between “brain” and the “rest of the body,” as all cognitive processes rely on bodily structures beyond the brain. The novelty is twofold: (1) consciousness is not “that of which” we are aware, but “that in virtue of which” world-directed actions and perceptions emerge, physically constituted by new neuromuscular dispositions stemming from repeated engagement; and (2) this integrative approach fully eliminates talk of “mental states,” demonstrating that all cognition—and therefore all consciousness—extends beyond the brain. In doing so, it strengthens responses to common eliminativist objections, including self-refutation, by obviating the need for an internal “belief state” behind actions or assertions. AnKa :: publisher 2025-03-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/141 10.5281/zenodo.15004005 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/141/126 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/141/179 Copyright (c) 2025 Arturo Leyva Pizano https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/142 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:artic

Do Cats Collapse the Wave Function? Confronting the Measurement Problem with Subliminal Priming Lucido, Richard James consciousness quantum wave function measurement problem Two experiments were conducted to address the measurement problem in quantum mechanics by leveraging the effects of subliminal priming, a well-developed research paradigm in cognitive psychology, to determine if conscious observation causes the wavefunction to collapse. In both experiments stimulus primes derived directly from patterns in a local source of radioactive decay were flashed on a screen for a duration of time too brief to be consciously experienced. They were immediately followed by a stimulus that participants were asked to rapidly respond to.  The stimulus was designed to be congruent with some primes and incongruent with others. If observation caused collapse, the primes, having been shielded from observation, should continue to exist in a state of superposition based on the radioactive decay from which they were derived.  Before the participants took the reaction time test, a third of the primes were observed by the experimenter, a third remained completely unobserved, and a third were observed by a cat.  If consciousness caused collapse, shorter response time differences would be expected in the primes that remained unobserved as opposed to those previously exposed to observation.  Consistent with previous research, primes subjected to prior human observation had a greater effect on reaction time than those that were denied that observation. Primes previously observed by the cat did not have any greater effect than those that remained completely unobserved, a finding which suggests that wave function collapse may be tied to a feature of human consciousness which is not universally shared. AnKa :: publisher 2025-03-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/142 10.5281/zenodo.15003998 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/142/125 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/142/180 Copyright (c) 2025 Richard James Lucido https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/151 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:hat

Metaphysical Tunneling: Probabilities of Transient Escape from the Hard Problem Mender, Donald broken symmetry causal closure Hard Problem inconsistent tetrad sombrero potential tunneling The Hard Problem is reframed as a tetrad of mutually inconsistent metaphysical propositions. Incompatibilities among the four propositions are dispatched not through the metaphysician’s customary and futile negation of some particular statement or statements within the tetrad but by introducing flexible quantum-formal links to replace more rigid classical logic connecting the four affirmed assertions. This abstract maneuver, logically reframing the Hard Problem, is made more concrete, pictorially accessible, and empirically testable through a description of subjectivity trapped in a sombrero-shaped potential landscape’s circumferential “gutter.” The metaphysical landscape’s shape, constrained by classical logic, breaks a symmetry hidden by current ignorance of the “Theory of Everything” or TOE, long sought by physicists. The circumferential gutter’s status as a collection of metaphysical vacua, each a discrete individual sensorium, obscures subjectivity’s relationship to the TOE’s physicality. It is argued that changing the tetrad’s formal scaffolding from classical to quantum logic allows brief reversible quantum-tunneled ascents by subjectivity from the circumferential gutter of vacua toward full TOE-like symmetry at the central peak of the sombrero-shaped potential. Probabilistically ambiguous attainment of the unknown TOE’s presumably unbroken symmetry through tunneling renders subjectivity’s relationship to physicality equivocal with regard to the causal closure of physics wrought by immunization of physical laws against intrusions by shifting qualia. Casimir-like effects and the Fourier duality of qualia are suggested as research targets for this experimentally falsifiable set of hypotheses. AnKa :: publisher 2025-04-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/151 10.5281/zenodo.15233756 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/151/128 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/151/181 Copyright (c) 2025 Donald Mender https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/152 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:artic

Abstraction and the Explanatory Gap: Physicalism and Dualism Combined Remler, Michael Explanatory Gap Abstraction Turing Dualist Physicalist The explanatory gap between consciousness and science can be understood only in contrast to those things with an adequate scientific explanation. Scientific explanation is built on the measurement of time, distance and mass etc. and relationship concepts such as true, equal to, etc. all of which are derived by the collective abstraction of many subjective experiences. Measurement and mathematics, because they are uniform across the whole of humanity, create an abstract symbiosis of all the separate consciousnesses. Those concepts supported by the symbiosis are of unique authority from which accepted explanations can be derived. Although they retain not one iota of the subjective experiences from which they were abstracted, they retain the authenticity of the subjective experience. The explanatory gap regarding consciousness derives from the fact that there is no analogous abstraction of the totality of mental processes of the human mind, in particular consciousness. Turing’s defined ‘thinking’ as that portion of human mental function that can be represented by a computational algorithm and that abstraction validated by the imitation game. To define the limits of symbiotic abstraction of human mentation, and document that via the imitation game, it is needed to further develop that approach to model the totality of externally observable individual behavior. Consciousness and its associated features like free will, qualia, etc. are intrinsically not observable and cannot be abstracted directly into the symbiosis. Non-observables entities such as black holes, quarks, etc. are identified, validated and explained as the most parsimonious understanding consistent with the structure of ideas anchored in the observables. Consciousness is irreducibly idiosyncratic and non-material and therefore irretrievably not possible to directly abstract. Therefore, a Materialist explanation within the current understanding is impossible. Dualism is the most parsimonious theory but fails for lack of a plausible interface with current physics. Entanglement and the mechanism of quantum collapse are established phenomena within physics not by any known material mechanism. Further understanding of these phenomena may provide the conceptual basis for an abstract non-material dualist model of consciousnesses with no explanatory gap. A model which both physicalist and dualist. AnKa :: publisher 2025-04-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/152 10.5281/zenodo.15259742 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/152/129 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/152/182 Copyright (c) 2025 Michael Remler https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/153 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:hat

Neuronal World: Illusionistic Explanation of the Empirical Reality Kondrat, Vladislav neuronal world neurorhythmics virtual reality neurophilosophy consciousness illusion illusionism The neurophilosophical concept of the neuronal world posits that brain activity (rhythms) creates a sophisticated virtual reality. According to the neuronal world model (NWM), virtual reality is a continuous construct of the brain, meticulously crafted through the electromagnetic synchronisation of neurons. The brain orchestrates the empirical world through a dynamic interplay of sensory inputs and neuronal states, with brain rhythms at the core of this process. Central to the model are its intricate components, including the self-model, which integrates various mentalisation modules to conjure the compelling illusion of subjectivity. Essential neuronal rhythms, particularly gamma and alpha oscillations, play crucial roles in sensory integration and cognitive stability, weaving the complex tapestry of perceptual experiences. High-frequency gamma rhythms dominate the empirical world, constructing detailed sensory experiences, while alpha and beta rhythms integrate sensory data with memory and imagination, fostering sophisticated cognitive functions. The neuronal activity results in a non-cohesive and fundamentally illusory representation of reality. By illuminating these mechanisms, the neuronal world model challenges conventional notions of consciousness, proposing a paradigm shift that views reality as an elaborate illusion crafted by neuronal processes. This perspective questions the very existence of consciousness as traditionally understood, advocating for a more accurate conception based on the neuronal world. Thus, it reshapes entrenched and simplistic approaches to studying consciousness, highlighting the need to rethink understanding reality. The aim of this article is to describe how the brain simulates virtual reality from the perspective of the neuronal world model, revealing the mechanisms underlying this neurosimulation. AnKa :: publisher 2025-05-15 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/153 10.5281/zenodo.15421379 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/153/132 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/153/183 Copyright (c) 2025 Vladislav Kondrat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/154 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:opper

Telepresence, the Brain, and Consciousness Goutos, George brain cerebellum consciousness telepresence virtual reality This article reexamines the long-standing assumption that consciousness arises solely from the forebrain, particularly the cerebral cortex. While traditional neuroscience has linked cortical activity with perception, reasoning, and the sense of self, alternative perspectives suggest that the brain’s most ancient structures — the cerebellum and brainstem — may play a foundational role in conscious experience. Through a combination of anatomical analysis, philosophical reflection, and thought experiments such as telepresence scenarios, this paper explores the possibility that consciousness could originate in the hindbrain, with the forebrain acting primarily as an interface for sensory and motor interaction. The discussion addresses common objections to this model, including findings from cerebellar agenesis and split-brain studies, and highlights new research implicating the cerebellum in higher cognitive functions. Broader implications for neuroscience and philosophy are considered, suggesting that a reevaluation of the hindbrain's role may reshape our understanding of consciousness and selfhood. AnKa :: publisher 2025-08-07 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/154 10.5281/zenodo.17292143 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/154/139 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/154/168 Copyright (c) 2025 George Goutos https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/156 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:opper

Why You Can Never Be Me: Toward an Ontological Mechanism for the Irreplicability of the First-Person Experience Goutos, George Consciousness, ontology, quantum, spacetime, uniqueness, brain This paper explores the source of the inherent uniqueness of first-person perspectives (FPPs), the subjective lens through which individuals experience the world. While much research has focused on universal aspects of consciousness, the distinctiveness of individual experience remains underexplored. It is proposed that FPPs are not merely emergent properties of the brain but may be fundamentally tied to the structure of reality itself. By examining biological, quantum, and ontological frameworks, it is argued that only an ontological basis—specifically, the unique coordinates of the spacetime continuum—can guarantee the absolute uniqueness of FPPs. Biological and quantum processes, while contributing to statistical uniqueness, cannot ensure irreplicability. The paper synthesizes ideas from neuroscience, quantum mechanics, and philosophy to present a cohesive framework, suggesting that consciousness and FPPs may emerge from the fabric of spacetime. This speculative yet structured approach aims to provide new avenues for understanding the origins of individuality in conscious experience and to inspire interdisciplinary research into the nature of consciousness.  AnKa :: publisher 2025-05-20 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/156 10.5281/zenodo.15470562 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/156/133 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/156/184 Copyright (c) 2025 George Goutos https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/157 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:opper

Neuroenhancement or Neurocheating? Rethinking Ethics in the Age of Cognitive Upgrades Correia de Barros, Eugénia neuroenhancement ethics neuroethics neuromodulation human nature In its widest definition, neuroenhancement describes actions done by healthy people to enhance their mental abilities beyond what is naturally possible. In contrast to therapy, which tries to reverse disease or lessen suffering, enhancement seeks to increase a person's potential regardless of disease or suffering. On the other hand, the growing application of neuromodulation technologies presents serious moral questions about social interaction and the pursuit of personal traits. Therefore, this paper aims to convince the scientific community that neuroenhancement has been used since the beginning of human civilization, whether through tools, inventions, or modern technologies. As such, it should be viewed as an extension of the innate human desire to innovate and improve. AnKa :: publisher 2025-05-14 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/157 10.5281/zenodo.15401051 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/157/130 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/157/185 Copyright (c) 2025 Eugénia Correia de Barros https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/161 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:opper

An Opinion on Werner Herzog’s Film “Theatre of Thought” Ludvig, Nandor cosmological neuroscience optogenetics deep brain stimulation consciousness Jane Goodall This paper was originally prepared as part of the author’s proposed special JNphi issue on Werner Herzog’s film on the prospects of 21st century of neuroscience, “Theatre of Thought”, released in 2024.  Whether the limited contribution to this issue was due to the film’s restricted public showing, problematic online availability or difficulty to generate interest in the neuroscientist community – this was not possible to determine.  The movie itself was the continuation of the director’s previous documentaries on the highest level of human intellectual products.  As such, the film effectively introduced to the viewer such highlights of contemporary neuroscience as experimenting with optogenetics, using deep brain stimulation for Parkinson’s disease therapy or capturing the mind with innovative brain circulation tests.   On the other hand, the film was burdened with a mass of unexplained information and even scientifically questionable experimental demonstrations.  As all films by this genius artist, the “Theatre of Thought” was also permeated with a pessimistic outlook on human creative endeavors, be they as mysterious as worthy of our admiration.   AnKa :: publisher 2025-07-09 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/161 10.5281/zenodo.15860759 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/161/135 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/161/186 Copyright (c) 2025 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/162 2026-01-24T10:08:28Z jnp:opper

Herzog’s Cartesian Theater: Skepticism, Self, and Stories in Theater of Thought Zuk, Peter neurotechnology consciousness illusionism skepticism transhumanism Werner Herzog This essay draws out some philosophical dimensions of Werner Herzog’s recent film Theater of Thought, which interweaves an overview of contemporary neurotechnology development with consideration of classical problems in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Over the course of the film, Herzog increasingly concerns himself with the challenge of philosophical skepticism. This preoccupation is framed as arising from his encounters, via certain of his scientist interviewees, with an outlook that I here term neuroscientific postmodernism. According to this outlook, modern neuroscience overturns our ordinary conception of ourselves as active, unified, conscious subjects of experience, and in so doing problematizes the application of the very concept of truth to the stories we tell about ourselves. As I interpret him, Herzog implicitly challenges this outlook on several fronts. His alternative emphasizes human spontaneity as it arises in everyday activities unmediated by digital technology, a reverential attitude toward consciousness and the mystery it presents, and a potential response to skepticism that invites comparison with those of Samuel Johnson, G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and O.K. Bouwsma. AnKa :: publisher 2025-07-09 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/162 10.5281/zenodo.15860786 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/162/134 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/162/187 Copyright (c) 2025 Peter Zuk https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/167 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:opper

Double Standards in Moral Judgments Within Intimate Relationships: A Multifaceted Perspective Yao, Shuchen Dong, Da Yang, Liping Yin, Yating In this opinion piece, we delve into the role of intimate relationships in shaping moral judgment, highlighting the notable disparity between appraisals of intimate others and strangers in instances of ethical transgressions. It contends that the double standard observed in these scenarios reflect the intricate interplay between human emotions and the adaptable nature of moral evaluation within different contexts. Drawing on the field of moral psychology, the analysis introduces pivotal theoretical frameworks, including moral reasoning, moral intuition, the hypotheses of moral universalism and moral favoritism, the dual-process theory of moral judgment, and a person-centered perspective on moral assessment. We center on pluralistic factors that influence moral judgment within intimate relationships, including emotion, cognition, value, perception of harm, perspective, and power dynamics. A notable incongruity is identified between the professed moral duties of people and their protective actions toward loved ones, with individuals frequently acting to defend intimate others despite holding conflicting moral principles. Besides, we conclude by exploring the repercussions of these double standards for modern legal systems. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/167 10.5281/zenodo.17292201 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/167/141 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/167/169 Copyright (c) 2025 Shuchen Yao, Da Dong, Liping Yang, Yating Yin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/168 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:pfn

What Is Authentic Personal Identity? A Philosopher Asks Neuroscientists Horne, Jeremy Personal identity is arguably the most critical aspect of human existence. A failure to understand who we are—as expressed in the ancient injunction “Know thyself”—or the presence of fragmented or conflicted identities can give rise to strife, ranging from interpersonal altercations and domestic violence to full-scale wars. This paper presents an interdisciplinary framework that integrates the dualities of reductionism and holism, as well as mind–body dualism, which are dialectically united in a common substratum supporting the concept of identity.  The model draws on biology—including genetics and neuroscience—as well as logic and arithmetics, to offer a digital description of identity. The philosophical contributions of several philosophers illustrate how logic underpins both psychological development and the ontology of being.  The physical dimension of identity begins with neuroanatomy and its fine structures, progressively reduced to genetic mechanisms, molecular processes, and atomic configurations governed by valence geometry. Quantum considerations are introduced to address the deeper substratum and latent human potential.  To counterbalance the reductionist analysis, a holistic approach—Authentic Systems—is proposed. This model seeks to uncover personal identity through the identification and interpretation of an individual’s life theme: a consistent behavioral pattern observed across the lifespan. Together, these approaches aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of personal identity at the intersection of the biological, psychological, and philosophical domains. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/168 10.5281/zenodo.17292250 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/168/143 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/168/170 Copyright (c) 2025 Jeremy Horne https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/171 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:opper

Do We Have Free Will, or Is Everything Predetermined? A Neuroethics Dilemma Guerreiro, João Free Will Determinism Libertarianism Neuroethics Philosophy of Mind Cognitive Neuroscience Moral Responsibility Readiness Potential Intentional Inhibition The debate over free will and determinism remains one of the most profound philosophical and scientific dilemmas, raising questions regarding human agency, morality, and responsibility. Determinism posits that all actions are dictated by prior causes and natural laws, leaving no room for genuine choice. In contrast, libertarianism argues that humans possess free will, enabling them to act independently of deterministic constraints. Neuroscientific studies, such as Benjamin Libet’s experiments on readiness potential and fMRI research predicting motor intentions, seem to support determinism by suggesting that unconscious brain activity precedes conscious decision-making. However, critics argue that these studies oversimplify free will by focusing on basic motor actions rather than complex cognitive processes. Furthermore, research on intentional inhibition and the ability to consciously override pre-programmed actions challenges deterministic interpretations, suggesting a role for conscious agency. While neuroscience provides valuable insights, the complexity of human thought extends beyond simple movement-based experiments. This paper explores the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience, emphasizing the need for a more nuanced understanding of free will that accounts for higher-order reasoning and moral decision-making. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/171 10.5281/zenodo.17292163 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/171/140 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/171/171 Copyright (c) 2025 João Guerreiro https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/172 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:artic

Art as Artifact: An Empirical Approach to Locating its Hedonic Function Durso, Dan neuroaesthetics art artifacts function ontology neural reward system Standard accounts of artifacts claim that they are objects purposefully designed by an agent (or agents) to realize a function.  Art objects have often been regarded as functionless entities; thus, many have disqualified them from possessing artifact status.  With this paper, I defend the view that art objects (at least paintings and sculptures) are, in fact, artifacts since they serve hedonic functions.  In my view, declarations for the functionless nature of art objects are due to an epistemically impoverished position regarding neural responses to artworks. I introduce recent research from neuroaesthetics, the study of the neural underpinnings of aesthetic experiences, which demonstrates that art objects act as a catalyst that stimulates the neural reward circuitry which in turn produces heightened hedonic sensations.  These hedonic sensations, I claim, are the function of art objects, art appreciators seek them out and artists desire to induce them. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/172 10.5281/zenodo.17292115 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/172/138 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/172/172 Copyright (c) 2025 Dan Durso https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/174 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:edit

Toward a Truly Beneficial AI Companion: A Call for Dialogue with Authors and Readers of the Journal of NeuroPhilosophy Ludvig, Nandor AI soul identity conscience will mission consciousness cosmos This Open Letter outlines a reasonable plan to create at least one truly beneficial AI companion for humankind: a semiconductor-based entity programmed to possess its own Soul. This Soul would represent a synthesis of the identities, consciences, wills, and missions of sages and other exemplary figures throughout human history. The author invites those interested in this vision of AI development to share their perspectives—whether in support of or in opposition to the proposed plan. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/174 10.5281/zenodo.17292061 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/174/136 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/174/173 Copyright (c) 2025 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/179 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:opper

The Influence of the Gut–Brain Axis on the Mind–Body Problem Guerreiro, João Ventura, Guilherme mind-body problem gut-brain axis microbiota glioma nursing This article reexamines the mind–body problem through the lens of neurobiology, psychiatry, and clinical practice, advocating for a biologically embedded and systematically distributed view of mental states. Drawing on emerging research into the gut–brain axis, where it describes how microbial composition, immune signaling, and nutrition influences mood, cognition, and emotional regulation. Evidence shows that dysbiosis and altered vagal signaling can reshape neuroanatomical structures and influence stress responses, challenging the traditional view of the mind as confined to the brain. The discussion also covers glioblastoma, a primary brain tumor that highlights the physical vulnerability of the mind. As the tumor infiltrates glial networks and disrupts cortical structure, patients experience significant changes in personality, memory, and emotional stability, showing that identity and agency depend on neural integrity. Clinical observations, particularly in nursing contexts, reinforce this systemic view. In both psychiatric and neuro-oncology settings, nurses play an important role in monitoring nutritional status, emotional resilience, and cognitive decline among patients, often serving as mediators between biological processes and psychological outcomes. Nursing interventions targeting diet, inflammation, and neurodegeneration have shown promise in improving treatment adherence and quality of life, further supporting the concept that distributed physiological networks shape mental health. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/179 10.5281/zenodo.17292227 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/179/142 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/179/174 Copyright (c) 2025 João Guerreiro, Guilherme Ventura https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/180 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:lett

Letter on Alzheimer's Disease in Light of My Research and the Distinction Between the Mental and the Physical Bucci, Andrea As clearly explained in the work by Zhang et al. (2024), dementia—and Alzheimer's disease in particular—afflicts an increasing number of people worldwide, reducing them to a devastating condition of life. Even today, Alzheimer's remains an incurable and largely misunderstood disease. Various explanatory hypotheses exist, which—as with the early stages of any theoretical framework—link one dysfunction after another in the search for a triggering or at least dominant cause. This way of speaking without technical jargon may raise a smile, but I am a philosopher, and if I am to speak about this issue, it is my responsibility to avoid technicalities as much as possible, so as not to confuse a theoretical and philosophical treatment with an empirical one, which rightly belongs to the domain of medicine and biology. AnKa :: publisher 2025-10-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/180 10.5281/zenodo.17292087 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/180/137 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/180/175 Copyright (c) 2025 Andrea Bucci https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/182 2026-03-23T12:27:55Z jnp:rev

NeuroPhilosophy and Free Will: Bridging Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Society in the Age of Neurotechnology Ikrar, Taruna Sophian, Alfi NeuroPhilosophy, Free Will, Agency, Neuroscience, Neuroethics, Artificial Intelligence, Brain–Computer Interfaces The free will debate has long been central to philosophy, connecting metaphysical questions of autonomy with issues of moral and legal responsibility. With the advent of neuroscience, this debate has shifted from speculative theorizing to empirical investigation. NeuroPhilosophy, pioneered by Patricia Churchland and others, provides a framework that integrates brain science with philosophical analysis, offering new ways to understand the nature of agency. This article presents a narrative review of key developments from 1983 to 2025, synthesizing findings from experimental neuroscience, philosophical theories, and recent interdisciplinary discussions in neuroethics and artificial intelligence. Special attention is given to Libet’s readiness potential studies, predictive neuroimaging approaches, and alternative models such as stochastic accumulator frameworks. Beyond laboratory evidence, this review explores contemporary challenges including brain–computer interfaces, predictive AI, and their implications for law and society. The novelty of this work lies in proposing a “spectrum model of agency,” which situates free will not as a binary condition but as a dynamic construct shaped by neural, social, and technological factors. By bridging empirical findings with normative philosophy, this review demonstrates how NeuroPhilosophy can reframe the free will debate, ensuring its relevance in the age of neurotechnology and global ethical concerns. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/182 10.5281/zenodo.ADDWILL01 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026): JNφphi: Articles Accepted for Publication 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/182/268 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/182/167 Copyright (c) 2025 Taruna Ikrar, Alfi Sophian https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/183 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:rev

The Neurobiology of Cognition in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: From Synaptic Plasticity to Cognitive Mapping Ikrar, Taruna Sophian, Alfi cognition, neurobiology, predictive coding, neuro-AI convergence, synaptic plasticity Cognition emerges from complex interactions among molecular, cellular, and network-level processes in the brain that allow adaptive representation, reasoning, and behavioral regulation. Recent advances in neurobiology, combined with artificial intelligence (AI) and computational modeling, have illuminated previously inaccessible aspects of cognitive mechanisms—ranging from synaptic plasticity to large-scale cognitive mapping. This review explores how neural substrates underpin core cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and prediction, and how these biological architectures inspire AI systems through neuro-symbolic and neuromorphic approaches. We examine the dynamic relationship between predictive coding, hierarchical cortical networks, and consciousness as a distributed emergent property. Furthermore, new insights from connectomics, optogenetics, and neural decoding provide unprecedented clarity about the biophysical basis of cognition. The convergence between neurobiology and AI offers not only models of intelligence but also novel frameworks to understand self-referential cognition, agency, and ethical implications of synthetic minds. Ultimately, the neurobiology of cognition is entering a transformative era where understanding the brain’s logic informs both human enhancement and machine consciousness. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/183 10.5281/zenodo.17938553 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/183/145 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/183/176 Copyright (c) 2025 Alfi Sophian https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/194 2026-03-23T12:27:55Z jnp:hat

How the Physical Symbols Systems Hypothesis and the Modularity Hypothesis are Reformulations of each Other Skansi, Sandro modularity; artificial intelligence; physical symbols system hypothesis, encapsulation, isotropy This paper examines the relationship between two influential theories in cognitive science and philosophy of mind: Fodor’s modularity of mind hypothesis and the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) proposed by Newell and Simon. Although modularity is traditionally framed as a theory of cognitive architecture and the PSSH as a computational account of intelligence, this paper argues that the distinction between them is largely conceptual rather than substantive. The central claim is that modularity and the PSSH are, in effect, reformulations of the same un-derlying theoretical commitment. The analysis begins with a critical review of Fodor’s defining criteria for modules, such as domain specificity, mandatory operation, informational encapsula-tion, and shallow outputs. While these conditions were intended to provide an empirically gro-unded account of mental organization, many of them remain vague or metaphorical. Neverthe-less, taken together, they imply that cognitive processes must be decomposable into functionally distinct components with standardized input–output relations. Such decomposability presupposes the manipulation of structured representations. From this, the paper derives its first key claim: any modular cognitive process necessarily involves symbolic processing. Modules can only func-tion if their outputs are formatted in a way that allows systematic recombination and communica-tion with other components. This requirement aligns directly with the notion of a physical symbol system. Modularity, therefore, implicitly assumes the symbolic ontology articulated explicitly by the PSSH. The argument then proceeds in the opposite direction. If the PSSH is correct in clai-ming that a physical symbol system is sufficient for general intelligent action, then general intelli-gence must be implementable via organized subsystems that operate on specific classes of sym-bols. At the functional level, these subsystems correspond to modules. This establishes a bidirec-tional equivalence: modularity entails symbolic processing, and symbolic processing entails mo-dular realizability. The paper concludes that long-standing debates opposing modularity to sym-bolic approaches rest on a false dichotomy, and that recognizing their equivalence offers a clearer framework for understanding both human and artificial intelligence. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/194 10.5281/zenodo.ADDWILL02 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026): JNφphi: Articles Accepted for Publication 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/194/269 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/194/166 Copyright (c) 2025 Sandro Skansi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/198 2026-03-23T12:27:55Z jnp:artic

St. Paul’s Illuminating Vision Protected by the Non-Christian Jewish King Agrippa II to Make the Spread of Christianity Possible: Cosmological Neuroscience on Illuminating Visions Ludvig, Nandor cosmological neuroscience, soul, AI, perceptions, Jesus, memory, cognition This work used the methods of cosmological neuroscience to examine the illuminating vision of St. Paul and its protection by the Jewish king Agrippa II – two interrelated stories credibly recorded in the 1st century AD.  Illuminating vision was defined as a complex perception less dependent on external sensory stimuli than on the emotionally hypercharged and motivationally signified neural streams emanating from the prefrontal cortical neural supercircuitry of Soul to overwhelm the entire cognitive system for a brief period with the truth of a life-changing recognition for the host.  It was added that analogous illuminating visions – however differently – also occurred in other exceptional people from Muhammad and Joan of Arc to Tesla and Arundhati Roy.  One important context of St. Paul’s illuminating vision was also examined, namely, his interaction with the Jewish king Agrippa II, who did help Paul to lay down the groundwork for Christianity.  The phenomenon of illuminating visions was considered as special to the human mind, an inimitable feature very difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in AI machineries. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/198 10.5281/zenodo.ADDWILL03 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026): JNφphi: Articles Accepted for Publication 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/198/267 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/198/165 Copyright (c) 2025 Nandor Ludvig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/199 2026-03-23T12:27:55Z jnp:rev

The Many within the One: A Neurophilosophical Inquiry into Consciousness, Identity, and Dissociation Belli, Hasan Lacin, Selin consciousness quantum panprotopsychism analytic idealism dissociative identity disorder ontology This paper explores the ontological and epistemological implications of consciousness through an interdisciplinary synthesis of analytic idealism, quantum panprotopsychism, and the clinical model of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Drawing on Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism, it argues that reality is fundamentally mental, constituted by a universal field of consciousness whose apparent multiplicity emerges from self-differentiation rather than physical fragmentation. Quantum ontology, particularly the principles of wave–particle duality and entanglement, serves as a heuristic metaphor for this dynamic interplay between unity and plurality within consciousness. The study examines the parallels between quantum models of cognition and psychodynamic structures of the self, proposing that the coexistence of “wave-state” (holistic) and “particle-state” (localized) consciousness reflects the dual nature of human awareness. Clinically, Dissociative Identity Disorder provides an empirically grounded analogy for understanding how one conscious system can host multiple, semi-autonomous centers of experience while maintaining overarching functional unity. Neuroimaging and trauma-theory data are discussed as evidence of structural dissociation, which, when reinterpreted philosophically, mirrors the idealist view of differentiated consciousness within a unified ontological field. However, the paper emphasizes that such analogies remain metaphorical rather than mechanistic, preserving the scientific and ethical integrity of psychiatric phenomena. Ultimately, this synthesis proposes a conceptual bridge between metaphysics and clinical science, situating consciousness as both a neurobiological and cosmological principle. While speculative, the framework provides a philosophically coherent and phenomenologically informed model for re-examining the nature of mind, matter, and identity in a post-materialist paradigm. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/199 10.5281/zenodo.ADDWILL04 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026): JNφphi: Articles Accepted for Publication 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/199/149 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/199/164 Copyright (c) 2025 Hasan Belli, Selin Lacin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

oai:ojs2.www.jneurophilosophy.com:article/200 2026-01-24T06:50:22Z jnp:hat

The Evolutionary and Biophysical Determinants of Maximum Lifespan: Scaling Laws, Brain Size, and Future Projections Tarlacı, Sultan mind artificial intelligence maximum lifespan The lifespan of all organisms is determined by an interplay of genetic architecture and environmental conditions. Within a population, the lifespan of the longest-lived individual defines the Maximum Lifespan (MLS). For contemporary Homo sapiens, this value is approximately 113 years, with verified records suggesting a potential upper bound of 115-120 years. Throughout human history, average life expectancy has increased dramatically. In early hominin populations, average lifespan was around 30-40 years, rising to about 60 years in the 20th century, and currently averaging 70-80 years in developed nations. This increase has significantly facilitated cumulative knowledge transfer and cultural complexity across generations. For modern humans, with a brain volume of ~1,446 cm³ and an observed MLS of ~95 years, the value calculated by this formula (~92 years) shows strong concordance. For instance, if human MLS were to increase to 200 years, brain volume would need to expand to approximately 5,688 cm³, body mass would also increase, and daily caloric intake would rise to ~1,523 kcal. This radical change would also affect reproductive strategies; the onset of sexual maturity could be delayed from the current 14-17 years to 30-37 years in a 200-year MLS scenario. In conclusion, focusing on a single mechanism—such as somatic mutations—is insufficient for understanding the limits of the human lifespan. AnKa :: publisher 2025-12-15 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/200 10.5281/zenodo.17938414 Journal of NeuroPhilosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2025) 1307-6531 eng https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/200/146 https://www.jneurophilosophy.com/index.php/jnp/article/view/200/177 Copyright (c) 2025 Sultan Tarlacı https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 69140b20d8bb95749a75c846e2ccb836