Journal of NeuroPhilosophy

St. Paul’s Illuminating Vision Protected by the Non-Christian Jewish King Agrippa II to Make the Spread of Christianity Possible

2025-12-03T21:39:31+03:00

This work used the methods of cosmological neuroscience to examine the illuminating vision of St. Paul and its protection by the Jewish king Agrippa II – two interrelated stories credibly recorded in the 1^st century AD. Illuminating vision was defined as a complex perception less dependent on external sensory stimuli than on the emotionally hypercharged and motivationally signified neural streams emanating from the prefrontal cortical neural supercircuitry of Soul to overwhelm the entire cognitive system for a brief period with the truth of a life-changing recognition for the host. It was added that analogous illuminating visions – however differently – also occurred in other exceptional people from Muhammad and Joan of Arc to Tesla and Arundhati Roy. One important context of St. Paul’s illuminating vision was also examined, namely, his interaction with the Jewish king Agrippa II, who did help Paul to lay down the groundwork for Christianity. The phenomenon of illuminating visions was considered as special to the human mind, an inimitable feature very difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in AI machineries.

Perspectival Uniqueness, the Individuation of Consciousness, and the Vertiginous ‘Why Am I Me?’

2026-02-14T17:39:24+03:00

This speculative paper develops a novel, interdisciplinary framework for the "Why am I me?" problem. It proposes that a unique phenomenal first-person perspective (PFPP) is not generated de novo by the brain, but is a primitive property that accompanies a single, continuous physical history: a spacetime worldline. Neural processes, particularly those of the hindbrain responsible for timing, prediction, and global coordination, function to stabilize and amplify this already fixed perspective, while cortical networks furnish the variable contents of perception, memory, and thought. The account argues that biological uniqueness is merely statistical and cannot ground the guaranteed exclusivity of first-person ownership. This exclusivity, it is suggested, is more plausibly anchored in the non-overlapping structure of relativistic spacetime itself. The proposal is explicitly conceptual and metaphysically speculative but is framed to yield testable empirical predictions. The loss and recovery of sentience should correlate more strongly with deep coordination systems than with cortical activity, and disruptions of hindbrain timing should specifically impair subjective unity, agency, and self-location. Failure of these predictions would falsify the view's core neural claims.

How the Physical Symbols Systems Hypothesis and the Modularity Hypothesis are Reformulations of each Other

2025-11-11T15:09:28+03:00

This paper examines the relationship between two influential theories in cognitive science and philosophy of mind: Fodor’s modularity of mind hypothesis and the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) proposed by Newell and Simon. Although modularity is traditionally framed as a theory of cognitive architecture and the PSSH as a computational account of intelligence, this paper argues that the distinction between them is largely conceptual rather than substantive. The central claim is that modularity and the PSSH are, in effect, reformulations of the same un-derlying theoretical commitment. The analysis begins with a critical review of Fodor’s defining criteria for modules, such as domain specificity, mandatory operation, informational encapsula-tion, and shallow outputs. While these conditions were intended to provide an empirically gro-unded account of mental organization, many of them remain vague or metaphorical. Neverthe-less, taken together, they imply that cognitive processes must be decomposable into functionally distinct components with standardized input–output relations. Such decomposability presupposes the manipulation of structured representations. From this, the paper derives its first key claim: any modular cognitive process necessarily involves symbolic processing. Modules can only func-tion if their outputs are formatted in a way that allows systematic recombination and communica-tion with other components. This requirement aligns directly with the notion of a physical symbol system. Modularity, therefore, implicitly assumes the symbolic ontology articulated explicitly by the PSSH. The argument then proceeds in the opposite direction. If the PSSH is correct in clai-ming that a physical symbol system is sufficient for general intelligent action, then general intelli-gence must be implementable via organized subsystems that operate on specific classes of sym-bols. At the functional level, these subsystems correspond to modules. This establishes a bidirec-tional equivalence: modularity entails symbolic processing, and symbolic processing entails mo-dular realizability. The paper concludes that long-standing debates opposing modularity to sym-bolic approaches rest on a false dichotomy, and that recognizing their equivalence offers a clearer framework for understanding both human and artificial intelligence.

Neurophilosophy of Consciousness: From Biological Basis to Subjective Reality

2026-02-11T08:32:20+03:00

Motivated by persistent challenges in linking neural dynamics to subjetive experience, and informed by our prior philosophical and neuroscientific research, this paper explores consciousness as an emergent, complex, and multidimensional property rooted in biological systems and shaped by evolutionary imperatives of survival. Based on a critical integration of neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science, a unified theory is articulated that links the neurobiological foundations of the conscious state, such as the role of the brain stem, thalamus, synapses, and neurotransmitters, with computational models of predictive processing, global diffusion, and information integration. It is argued that consciousness is not a phenomenon of all or no but rather emerges gradually from homeostatic affective levels toward more complex forms of self-awareness and metacognition. Furthermore, consciousness is analyzed as an active simulation of the environment, challenging naive realism and reframing the problem of free will from the perspective of predictive processing. A five-level hierarchical model is proposed, ranging from homeostatic regulation to metacognition and phenomenological complexity. Finally, ethical and philosophical implications arising from advances in neuroscience and biotechnology, such as brain organoids, are addressed. The aim is no to close the mystery of consciousness, but to transform it into a series of questions that can be addressed through an integrated scientific and philosophical approach.

Consciousness as a Narrativized Self: The Role of Abstract and Inner Thought in Forming the Conscious Experience

2026-02-12T23:18:48+03:00

The "hard problem" of consciousness, explaining how physical processes give rise to subjective experience, often leads to speculations beyond empirical science. This article suggests a framework that reinterprets consciousness not as a singular entity but as an emergent, narrativized self-model constructed by the brain. We argue that through the interplay of abstract and inner thought, primarily facilitated by language and implemented by networks such as the Default Mode Network (DMN), the brain generates a running narrative that integrates memories, perceptions, and interoceptive signals into a first-person story of a self-acting in a world. We have supported this by synthesizing evidence from neuroscience, developmental psychology, and philosophy. Although this view does not dissolve the hard problem, it demystifies consciousness by aligning it with other abstract, brain-constructed concepts like creativity or morality, suggesting it is a unique product of the brain's interpretive storytelling function rather than a metaphysical mystery. By implementing this structure and adding these elements, the manuscript will transform from an interesting collection of ideas into a powerful, coherent, and scholarly argument that makes a genuine contribution to the field.

Planck Time and the Chemical Soup: The Quantum and Metaphysical Limits of Imitating Consciousness in Machines

2025-12-11T12:34:27+03:00

The boundaries of machine consciousness lie at the intersection of physics, biology, and metaphysics. Although computational power advances rapidly, it remains constrained by the fundamental laws of the universe. Jack Ng (2000) demonstrated that the product of processing speed and stored information is limited by Planck time—the smallest measurable unit of time (≈10⁻⁴³ s)—establishing an ultimate ceiling for information processing. These physical limits suggest that no artificial system can transcend the quantum–gravitational constraints inherent to reality. In contrast, the human brain functions as a dynamic biochemical and electrical system—a “chemical soup” of neurotransmitters, receptors, and ion channels generating subjective awareness. Yet, how consciousness and selfhood emerge from this biological complexity remains unresolved. This study contrasts dualistic and monistic interpretations of consciousness. Dualism posits a metaphysical “essence” beyond material explanation, implying that true artificial consciousness is unattainable. Monism views consciousness as an emergent property of neural information dynamics, potentially reproducible in machines. Ultimately, while machines may simulate awareness, they cannot replicate the quantum–metaphysical foundation of human consciousness. Thus, the final word on artificial consciousness remains unspoken—bounded by both physics and philosophy.

The Tenant in the Mind: Consciousness and Its Imperatives

2026-01-19T09:53:21+03:00

The Tenant in the Mind by Mark Christhilf explores the enigmatic concept of consciousness, examining its presence as a fundamental force that shapes both individual identity and the universe itself. The introduction highlights that while consciousness is essential to human experience, it remains an unresolved mystery, with scientists and philosophers divided over its nature and origin. Christhilf proposes that consciousness isn't merely a biological phenomenon but a universal force active in everything, from atoms to galaxies, and central to societal structures and personal ethics. The Tenant in the Mind by Mark Christhilf is a comprehensive exploration of consciousness as both a personal experience and a universal force. The book begins with an acknowledgment of the mystery of consciousness, a phenomenon felt by all but not fully understood. Consciousness, Christhilf argues, is not only central to human thought and identity but also permeates the physical world and the universe, influencing everything from atomic structures to global political systems. The author frames consciousness as a universal principle, operating through both creation and destruction, which guides human ethics, societal structures, and individual growth.

The Many within the One: A Neurophilosophical Inquiry into Consciousness, Identity, and Dissociation

2025-12-09T00:29:24+03:00

This paper explores the ontological and epistemological implications of consciousness through an interdisciplinary synthesis of analytic idealism, quantum panprotopsychism, and the clinical model of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Drawing on Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism, it argues that reality is fundamentally mental, constituted by a universal field of consciousness whose apparent multiplicity emerges from self-differentiation rather than physical fragmentation. Quantum ontology, particularly the principles of wave–particle duality and entanglement, serves as a heuristic metaphor for this dynamic interplay between unity and plurality within consciousness. The study examines the parallels between quantum models of cognition and psychodynamic structures of the self, proposing that the coexistence of “wave-state” (holistic) and “particle-state” (localized) consciousness reflects the dual nature of human awareness. Clinically, Dissociative Identity Disorder provides an empirically grounded analogy for understanding how one conscious system can host multiple, semi-autonomous centers of experience while maintaining overarching functional unity. Neuroimaging and trauma-theory data are discussed as evidence of structural dissociation, which, when reinterpreted philosophically, mirrors the idealist view of differentiated consciousness within a unified ontological field. However, the paper emphasizes that such analogies remain metaphorical rather than mechanistic, preserving the scientific and ethical integrity of psychiatric phenomena. Ultimately, this synthesis proposes a conceptual bridge between metaphysics and clinical science, situating consciousness as both a neurobiological and cosmological principle. While speculative, the framework provides a philosophically coherent and phenomenologically informed model for re-examining the nature of mind, matter, and identity in a post-materialist paradigm.

NeuroPhilosophy and Free Will: Bridging Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Society in the Age of Neurotechnology

2025-10-06T14:33:32+03:00

The free will debate has long been central to philosophy, connecting metaphysical questions of autonomy with issues of moral and legal responsibility. With the advent of neuroscience, this debate has shifted from speculative theorizing to empirical investigation. NeuroPhilosophy, pioneered by Patricia Churchland and others, provides a framework that integrates brain science with philosophical analysis, offering new ways to understand the nature of agency. This article presents a narrative review of key developments from 1983 to 2025, synthesizing findings from experimental neuroscience, philosophical theories, and recent interdisciplinary discussions in neuroethics and artificial intelligence. Special attention is given to Libet’s readiness potential studies, predictive neuroimaging approaches, and alternative models such as stochastic accumulator frameworks. Beyond laboratory evidence, this review explores contemporary challenges including brain–computer interfaces, predictive AI, and their implications for law and society. The novelty of this work lies in proposing a “spectrum model of agency,” which situates free will not as a binary condition but as a dynamic construct shaped by neural, social, and technological factors. By bridging empirical findings with normative philosophy, this review demonstrates how NeuroPhilosophy can reframe the free will debate, ensuring its relevance in the age of neurotechnology and global ethical concerns.

What Must a Successful Theory of Consciousness Explain? Mapping the Requirements Across Philosophy, Neuroscience, Physics, and Psychology for a Truly Comprehensive Model of Mind

2026-02-17T13:09:04+03:00

Throughout intellectual history, the relationship between the immaterial aspects of human existence and the physical body has been conceptualized under various guises: the soul-body, mind-body, and most contemporarily, the consciousness-brain problem—symbolized as the psi-phi (ψ-φ) problem. This paper argues that while historical discourse framed the debate in terms of a soul inhabiting a body, modern understanding necessitates greater precision: the central challenge is to elucidate the relationship between consciousness and the brain, as the mind is fundamentally a product of cerebral processes. Despite decades of neuroscientific research, a comprehensive and universally accepted theory of consciousness remains elusive. This elusiveness stems from a core paradox: consciousness, the very phenomenon we seek to explain, is inherently unobservable to the third-person methods of empirical science. Science, reliant on sensory data, can only obtain indirect correlates of conscious experience, leading to a proliferation of theories that remain, as Nick Herbert noted, more akin to fantasies than robust scientific explanations. The foundational axis of the debate revolves around two dominant metaphysical frameworks: monism and dualism. Monism, in its materialist form (Hobbes to Crick), posits that mental states are entirely reducible to physical brain activity—consciousness is an emergent property of neuronal interactions. An extreme variant, panpsychism (Berkeley, Hume), inverts this, asserting that mind is fundamental to all matter.

The Social System Defined by Trialism

2026-01-27T04:29:05+03:00

Truth is not only absolute fairness, but also means unanimous consensus, which lies herein as the key that truly drives social progress today. Although every truth must have absoluteness and immutability, and does not exist in reality, and belongs to the category of metaphysics, it has continuity with relevant objective things in reality, and its intrinsic mechanism is inertia. Based on this, I initially created the “Trialism on things' limits”, which resolved the dilemma that truth had no place to reside in dualism and could only be passed over ambiguously, and expanded the philosophical view of materialism to the category of metaphysics. The major social systems in the world today all aim for fairness as their goal pursued. Among them, the obedience of the minority to the majority constitutes the main body of the dualistic social system, and its flaw lies in imposing the consensus of part of the people on others. And the social system defined by Trialism is based on dualism to add unanimous consensus as a third aspect, and a unity of opposites is formed by virtue of the absoluteness of truth together with the democracy and centralism in reality. With the reasonable return of methodology from dualism to Trialism, war can hardly begin because ambiguity disappears. The higher the proportion of consensus, the higher the productive forces. As a result, we can more reasonably and efficiently do that “concentrate on accomplishing major tasks” in a long-term peaceful environment to escort the pursuit of a better life for humanity.