Journal of NeuroPhilosophy
Journal of NeuroPhilosophy
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Neuroscience + Philosophy
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ISSN 1307-6531
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AnKa :: publisher, since 2007

The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of Discrete Normotypical and Pathological Modes

Andrew A. Fingelkurts*†, Alexander A. Fingelkurts†, Tarja Kallio-Tamminen‡
*†BM-Science – Brain and Mind Technologies Research Centre, Espoo, Finland; ‡Physics Foundations Society and Society for Natural Philosophy, Helsinki, Finland
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.10203089
Abstract

In this first-of-its-kind neurophenomenological study we investigated the dynamic configuration and the levels of variability of the "Self"-, "Me"-, and "I"- components that comprise a complex experiential Selfhood across 16 distinct modes covering a range of healthy-normal, altered, and pathological brain states. The phenomenology was addressed by examining the mental structures of subjective self-experience, and for the neurophysiological counterpart, we used electroencephalogram analysis to gather data on three subnets of the self-referential brain network that correspond to the three components of Selfhood. This methodological approach allowed us to uncover peculiarities and generalities in the dynamic of the Selfhood triad across a wide range of modes that could not be seen in a single study. We showed that any given Selfhood state is determined by varying proportions of "Self", "Me", and "I"-components depending on the phenomenological manifestation of a particular mode. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the "Self"-component has more leeway in expressing various pathological modes while having a very narrow window for variance in norm. The "I"-component, on the other hand, exhibits the opposite tendency, with a wide range of normal modes and only a narrow window for true pathological expression. Finally, the "Me"-component expresses a position intermediate between the "Self"- and "I"-components (though closer to the "I"-component). The findings are discussed with an emphasis on their theoretical, conceptual, philosophical, and clinical implications.

Key Words:
Triad Model of Selfhood, Self-Me-I, Self-Referential Brain Network (SRN), Default-Mode Network (DMN), Subjective Sense of Self, First-Person Perspective, Electroencephalogram (EEG), Alpha Rhythm, Operational Synchrony, Functional Connectivity, Depersonalization Disorder (DD), Depression, Meditation, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Schizophrenia, Vegetative State (VS), Minimally Conscious State (MCS), Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS)

"Who is the I that knows the bodily me, who has an image of myself and a sense of identity over time, who knows that I have propriate strivings?" I know all these things, and what is more, I know that I know them. But who is it who has this perspectival grasp?

— Allport, 1961 (p. 128)

"[I]t is an experience we cannot help but take to be of being someone, even though there is no entity causing the experience."

— Gerrans, 2015 (p. 1)

Introduction

Since the earliest sparks of self-awareness in the first humans to the philosophers and scientists of today, people have attempted to understand themselves, comprehend the nature of and why Self exists. Despite this collective effort, and the fact that our conscious experience of self with related emotions and feelings is the only reality we know perspectivally, the Selfhood phenomenon is still somewhat elusive and poorly understood (Fingelkurts et al., 2020). As the two epigraphs above demonstrate, the precise definition of what exactly constitutes a sense of Selfhood is difficult to achieve. Be that as it may, based on the insights of many scholars, researchers and thinkers (Gallagher, 2000; 2013; Metzinger, 2003; Zahavi, 2005; Hohwy, 2007; Damasio, 2010; Strawson, 2011; Musholt, 2015; Northoff, 2016; Millière, 2020), we have previously proposed the following definition: the "experiential Selfhood refers to a sense of the undergoing experience in its implicit first-person mode of givenness that is immediately and tacitly given as mine [...] and it is accompanied by a functionally autonomous experience of subjective confidence or certitude [...], making it possible to be engaged in autobiographical thoughts involving semantic and episodic memory events related to self, as well as projecting the self into the future, thus enabling the sense of invariance of a narrative self over time [...]" (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2022a; p. 182; for further elaboration, see also Fingelkurts et al., 2020; p. 23). This definition plausibly reflects the multilayered nature of the Selfhood phenomenon that is expressed by adopting different concepts related to self in various knowledge domains (Strawson, 2011; Musholt, 2015; Northoff, 2016). In addition, it is in line with the Gallagher's "pattern theory of self" (2013), in which self is considered as a complex pattern that emerges from the dynamic interactions of characteristic aspects (or qualities) that jointly make up self, although no individual aspect/component alone may be necessary or specific to constitute a self "[...] as if they are simply modifying something that has its own independent existence" (Gallagher, 2013; p. 1).

Capitalizing on this definition and related empirical evidence, the neurophysiological three-dimensional construct model of experiential Selfhood was recently introduced (for an overview and empirical support, see Fingelkurts et al., 2020; for further discussion, see Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011; Fingelkurts et al., 2022). This triad model of Selfhood explicitly (i) reflects the self-awareness' multifaceted and multilayered nature (Snodgrass and Thompson, 1997; Musholt, 2015; Millière, 2020) and (ii) delineates the phenomenological distinctions between three key Selfhood aspects (namely first-person agency, embodiment/emotion, and reflection/narration), which are all commensurate with one another (Gallagher, 2013) and together constitute a coherent sense of Selfhood (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011; Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022).

The triad model of Selfhood

The triad model of Selfhood is built on neurophenomenological evidence (Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022). Neurophenomenology was originally developed as a novel research paradigm with the intention of bringing together two distinct approaches that appeared to be incompatible (Varela, 1996): (i) the neuroscientific experimental approach (quantitative data) and (ii) the phenomenological approach (qualitative data) by combining the lived, experiential data with neuroscientific data (Olivares et al., 2015), where first-person accounts and neurophysiological data mutually inform one another (Varela, 1996; Gallagher and Sørensen, 2006; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). Such research paradigm lays the basis for a "non-reductive neurophilosophy" (Northoff, 2016) and has already produced numerous novel results (Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Froese and Fuchs, 2012; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2020). Indeed, once the philosophies of materialism and substance dualism, which are based on outdated ideas of classical Newtonian physics, are abandoned, there are no more methodological barriers to incorporating knowledge based on first-person experiences into the sphere investigated by the scientific (hypothetico-deductive) method (Kallio-Tamminen, 2004).

Neurophysiological Basis

In terms of neurophysiology, the triad model of Selfhood takes into account the three major, spatially distinct, yet functionally interacting brain subnets — operational modules (OMs) — that collectively constitute the self-referential network (SRN) (Fingelkurts et al., 2022), also known as the default mode network (Raichle et al., 2001; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011; Northoff, 2016). Each OM is made up of a set of brain regions that have tight "functional connectivity" with one another (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011) and that can be reliably estimated by means of operational synchrony analysis of the electroencephalogram (EEG) signal (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2008, 2015). In other words, every OM is a functional integration of a number of local brain fields that have been registered by the EEG electrodes that correspond to them. These fields, in their turn, are the integration of even smaller local fields produced by transient functional neuronal assemblies (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2008, 2015). As a result, every OM has a distinct nested functional hierarchy in which higher levels of the hierarchy are physically composed of lower levels (Feinberg, 2000). Together, the three OMs form a higher level of functional nested architecture — the SRN (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011; Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022). The OMs' triad consists of one anterior OM and two symmetrical (left and right) occipito-parieto-temporal OMs (Fingelkurts et al., 2020).

Phenomenological Correlates

Phenomenologically, the anterior OM is linked to the phenomenal first-person perspective and the phenomenal sense of agency (Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022). It is labelled "witnessing observer" or just "Self" in the narrowest sense (Fingelkurts et al., 2020) — as the phenomenal non-conceptual core in the act of knowing itself (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009); or, according to Velmans (2014), a sensed "centre of gravity" where one has an experience of being directly and immediately present as the focal point of a phenomenal multimodal perceptual reality (Metzinger, 2003; Revonsuo, 2006; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). The right posterior OM is associated with the subjective experience of self as an entity that is typically localized (through interoceptive and exteroceptive sensory processing integration) within bodily boundaries — i.e., embodiment; this experience also includes related emotional states and autobiographical emotional memories (Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022). It is labelled "representational-emotional agency" or just "Me" (Fingelkurts et al., 2020). This component of Selfhood is conceptually equivalent to the "minimal self" of Gallagher (2000), the "proto-self" of Panksepp (2005), and the "bodily self" of Damasio (2010). The distinguishing characteristic of this "Me"-module is that, instead of a phenomenal first-person perspective, here only a purely geometrical first-person perspective is present that originates from within the body representation, thus denoting an egocentric spatiotemporal self-model (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009) where one perceives the environment from a particular spatiotemporal point. The left posterior OM is responsible for the experience of thinking about and reflecting on oneself as oneself, that includes momentary narrative thoughts and inner speech, as well as reinterpretation of episodic and semantic memory events related to self — autobiographical story telling/narration (Fingelkurts et al., 2020, 2022). It is labelled "reflective agency" or just "I" (Fingelkurts et al., 2020). This component of Selfhood is conceptually related to the "conceptual self" of Neisser (1988), the "narrative self" of Gallagher (2000), the "autonoetic self" of Gardiner (2001) and Klein (2016), and the "autobiographical self" of Damasio (2010). It is this narrative self-reflection, which relies on the human's language capability (Damasio, 2010; Gallagher, 2000; Craig, 2004), that underprints the sense of invariance of Selfhood over time (James, 1890; Metzinger, 2015). And, according to Zahavi, it is "[...] the self that forms plans, makes promises, and accepts responsibilities, the self that is defined and shaped by its values ideas, goals, convictions and decisions" (Zahavi, 2014; p. 50). These competencies are intricately associated with the notions of individual autonomy and moral personhood (Haanila, 2022; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2023).

Key Insights from the Article

1 Any given Selfhood state is determined by varying proportions of "Self", "Me", and "I"-components depending on the phenomenological manifestation of a particular mode.
2 The "Self"-component has more leeway in expressing various pathological modes while having a very narrow window for variance in norm.
3 The "I"-component exhibits the opposite tendency, with a wide range of normal modes and only a narrow window for true pathological expression.
4 The "Me"-component expresses a position intermediate between the "Self"- and "I"-components (though closer to the "I"-component).
5 A dynamic delicate equilibrium between the expression of the "Self"-, "Me"-, and "I"-components is required for the neurotypical coherent Selfhood sense to be present during everyday wakefulness.
6 Excess or lack of expression in any of the three Selfhood components ("Self", "Me", and "I") is an alteration or deviation from the coherent state and may potentially be related not only to altered states observed in the normal population, but also to psychopathological conditions.
7 The same triad structure of human Selfhood, albeit with varying manifestations of each constituent component, is likely to be a ubiquitous characteristic across the diverse range of human mental states.
8 Not all variations in the Selfhood components that characterize many pathological Selfhood modes are always incompatible with normal Selfhood functioning, indicating that some degrees of variability during neuropsychopathology may be regarded as falling within the bounds of normality.
9 A "true" unconscious state is always characterized by the absence of the witnessing agent (expressed through the "Self"-component) to whom the experience would otherwise occur and be integrated within the first-person meaningful perspective.
10 Selfhood is a "process" overall, and it is only within this process that "Self", "Me", and "I" can be found.

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Corresponding author

Dr. Andrew A. Fingelkurts

Address: BM-Science – Brain and Mind Technologies Research Centre, Espoo, Finland

Email: andrew.fingelkurts@bm-science.com