1st International Neurophilosophy Symposium

Neurophilosophy, as a word, began somewhat shyly as a mere nickname. The more neuroscience discovered, however, the more proper and pertinent the name seemed. That is, the project of studying the brain — at all levels — to advance understanding of how we move, think decide, and consciously operate, became ever more productive. Crucial in this progress was the invention of new techniques and new computational tools, along with the generation of new ideas and the blending of data from related disciplines such as genetics, cognitive science and machine learning. To be sure, many major questions about brain functions remain, everywhere you turn. One problem I have been working on with Lyle Muller and Terry Sejnowski concerns how visual signals, each in the millisecond range, are integrated across time to yield complex signals such as the visual sight of a dog running, a perception in the seconds range. From a very different direction, the neurobiology of sociality in mammals and birds, and what it tells us about human sociality is a long-time passion of mine. Self-preservation is embodied in our brain's circuitry: we seek food when hungry, warmth when cold, and mates when lusty. In the evolution of the mammalian brain, circuitry for regulating one's own survival and well-being was modified. For sociality, the important result was that the ambit of me extends to include others — me-and-mine. Offspring, mates, and kin came to be embraced in the sphere of me-ness; we nurture them, defend them, keep them warm and safe, and share food with them. The brain knows these others are not me, but if I am attached to them, their plight fires-up caring circuitry, motivating other-care. Thus does pure selfishness give way to care for others. But... why did this behavior evolve?

"Consciousness" emerges as a fundamental term and problem in the philosophical evaluation of the data revealed by neuroscience, which has become increasingly important today, as a result of its studies on the brain. One of the responsibilities of neurophilosophy is to question the content of the term consciousness as used in neuroscience and all assumptions about consciousness, and to provide satisfactory explanations for the problem of the consciousness-brain correlation. In this respect, the relevant study objects to thinking of consciousness as a noun, as it is usually conceived, and suggests that we think of it as a verb. Considering consciousness as a noun leads to the assumption of a substance/being independent of the relations that make it what it is. This means the construction of an imaginary entity as the bearer of all mental activities. However, considering consciousness as an activity/verb requires treating consciousness as the totality of the reciprocal relations of the contents of consciousness. Therefore, when trying to understand consciousness, what needs to be particularly focused on is the diversity of the contents of consciousness that express experiences. This study, while proposing to think of consciousness as a verb, will try to question and analyze what is meant by the diversity of the contents of consciousness to be called social consciousness.

Unfortunately, the closeness of neuroscience and philosophy, which basically comes from sharing similar issues, has not yielded any significant results to date. The basis of this situation is the different methods and approaches of both disciplines. There are different suggestions on how to get out of this situation and establish a productive collaboration. In particular, there are suggestions such as supporting the data accumulation that neuroscience creates in border areas such as consciousness, free will, etc. by creating philosophical models, providing conceptual frameworks, and improving the experimental designs of neuroscience. We think that these fragmented approaches also constitute a part of the unproductive interaction. We think that a more fundamental approach is needed to solve the problem, a holistic cognitive ontology program for neuroscience with the support of philosophy. We look at the newly emerging foundations of cognitive ontology studies and think that the effort may have expansions that can progress to creating a new philosophical ontology of the mind. We argue that efforts to create a new ontology of philosophy of mind, starting with the Cognitive ontology, with the support of philosophy within neuroscience, should replace the aggregation approaches that do not work because they are fragmentary and cannot produce the expected effect.

Discussions about the phenomenon of consciousness can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to antiquity. Within this framework, the phenomenon of consciousness has been analyzed and examined through the concepts of different eras. However, with the rise of science during the Enlightenment, thoughts regarding the physical foundations of consciousness began to shift significantly. Questions about the nature of our inner or mental experiences, the contexts or circumstances in which mental states occur, and the relationship between mental states and physical laws remain subjects of debate even today. In the present era, where debates about whether robots possess consciousness are gaining prominence, understanding the nature of human consciousness has become increasingly critical. Questions such as what is thought, subjective consciousness, and the nature of the mind? Are not only of profound importance but also necessitate an exploration of how the definitions of consciousness have evolved throughout history and how they might continue to change. When examining the ontological foundations of consciousness, three distinct theoretical frameworks emerge: dualism, idealism, and materialism. In addition, neurophilosophy, developed approximately 40 years ago by Patricia Smith Churchland and Paul Montgomery Churchland, represents a pivotal movement in this domain. Although sometimes described as reductive or eliminative materialism, this movement is predominantly characterized as both eliminative and reductive. Folk psychology, on the other hand, refers to the common-sense theories of mind encoded in language and widely employed by individuals or societal institutions. These theories have permeated behavioral and social sciences, shaping them in significant ways. Neurophilosophy, as a discipline, seeks to address philosophical questions regarding the phenomenon of consciousness by drawing on neuroscientific data. In this sense, all discussions about our inner nature fundamentally revolve around three central issues: the ontological issue, the semantic issue, and the epistemological issue.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is one of the most notable philosophers who argues that phenomenal experience is a phenomenon that cannot be explained by intellectualism or empiricism. According to him, the ambiguous, embodied and lived from a certain perspective structure of consciousness experiences cannot be grasped by these approaches with all its vitality. In other words, both approaches represent a reductionist attitude. In this respect, even though the "easy problem" can have an explanation, the complexity of the "hard problem" makes it difficult to give an account for it. As a matter of fact, it can be said that the source of phenomenal experience being 'descriptive' rather than 'explicable' lies here. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a thorough explanation of the physiological background of subjective experiences, even if it does not describe the experience itself, would contribute greatly to understanding its place and role in the life of a living organism and, moreover, to clarifying the "difficult problem" a little more. It can be said that the most important contribution in this direction was made by Antonio Damasio. The life-experience that Damasio suggests through the concepts of emotion and feeling not only shows that it is the activity of a bodily subject, but also points out how we have a holistic structure as an organism. Thus, it becomes clear that our phenomenal experience is actually a part of the organism's well-being. In this presentation titled "A Neurophilosophical Attempt on the Origin of Phenomenal Experience", the phenomenal experience will be discussed from a neurophilosophical perspective.

In this study, the concept of well-being (eudaimonia) in neurophilosophy and Aristotle's thought will be addressed. First, the concept of eudaimonia in Aristotle's ethics will be discussed. According to Aristotle, this concept describes a state of well-being that encompasses not just specific moments in a person's life but their entire life. It is, in fact, more of an activity than a state, and when we consider all of a person's actions, their ultimate goal is to live a life in accordance with eudaimonia. In contemporary times, well-being has been divided into hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Hedonic well-being is defined as an individual's emotional and cognitive evaluation of their life in relation to short-term pleasure, while eudaimonic well-being is related to realizing one's potential, personal development, self-acceptance, life purpose, and autonomy. However, it is necessary to theoretically establish the boundaries of this concept, which is difficult to study experimentally, and to investigate how individuals can move toward well-being. In this context, it is believed that establishing a connection between Aristotle's understanding of well-being and the perspectives of neurology and neurophilosophy on well-being will contribute to this area.

There is a prevailing but controversial opinion that information derived from quantum mechanics can be used to solve the brain-consciousness problem. In this talk, it will be discussed whether the "complementary principle" that Niels Bohr put forward, especially regarding the "particle-wave" duality, can be accepted as a "paradigmatic example" in a Kuhnian sense. In particular, the issue of whether the Penfield experiment can be considered epistemologically similar to the "double slit experiment" of quantum mechanics will be brought to the forefront.

Neurophilosophy is an interdisciplinary field of study that merges neuroscience and philosophy to provide a deeper understanding of the mind and consciousness. It is grounded in the belief that advancements in brain science can help address longstanding philosophical debates about fundamental issues such as the nature of the self, free will, consciousness, and the relationship between the mind and the body. At its core, neurophilosophy explores how neural processes give rise to mental phenomena like perception, thought, emotion, and consciousness. This field does not only focus on the technical workings of the brain but also seeks to engage with broader philosophical questions about identity, autonomy, and the intricate connections between mind and body. The discipline draws upon a range of fields, including neuroscience, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychology. Neurophilosophy uniquely combines empirical research and philosophical inquiry, striving to bridge the gap between these two domains in order to develop new perspectives on how the brain functions and how mental phenomena emerge. This integrative approach allows it to generate fresh insights and deepen our understanding of the human mind. As a rapidly evolving field, neurophilosophy is on the frontier of exciting discoveries about the mind and consciousness, which are likely to have a significant impact on our broader understanding of human experience. Advanced neurophilosophy goes even further, incorporating cutting-edge research in neuroscience to probe the complexities of mental processes and consciousness. It challenges traditional philosophical approaches by demanding that concepts like consciousness and free will be understood in light of empirical data about the brain. One of the most influential figures in the field, Patricia Churchland, has had a significant impact on neurophilosophy through her efforts to bridge philosophy and neuroscience. She emphasizes that in order to fully grasp the nature of the mind, it is essential to understand the brain's neural processes. Churchland's interdisciplinary approach has helped to bridge the gap between philosophy and neuroscience, and has contributed to a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the mind and brain. Her work continues to influence the field of neurophilosophy and to shape our understanding of the relationship between the brain and the mind. Churchland's work has played a crucial role in shaping the development of neurophilosophy, and has helped to establish the field as an important area of interdisciplinary research. Her insights and perspectives continue to influence current research and scholarship in the field, and are likely to shape the future direction of neurophilosophy for years to come. Like any prominent figure in philosophy, Patricia Churchland has been subject to a range of criticisms from other scholars in the field.

Baruch Spinoza is often cited as an early advocate of current ideas in neuroscience and neurobiology as well as the idea of embodied cognition, so much so that the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has even called him the prototype of neurobiology. In this talk, I will examine in what way Spinoza's ideas as they have been presented in the Ethics are important to current discussions of the mind-body problem. In doing so, I will not attempt to demonstrate the similarities between Spinoza's views and the current debates in contemporary neuroscience studies, but rather to show how Spinoza's ontological and ethical understanding, which is also a problematisation of Descartes' mind-body dualism and his ontology of emotions, offers a broad ontological framework for the problem of consciousness.